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ABSTRACT
Vehicle Pseudonym Association Attack Model
Pierson Yieh

With recent advances in technology, Vehicular ad hoc Networks (VANETs) have
grown in application. One of these areas of application is Vehicle Safety Communication (VSC) technology. VSC technology allows for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications that enhance vehicle safety and driving experience. However, these newly developing technologies bring with them a
concern for the vehicular privacy of drivers. Vehicles already employ the use of
pseudonyms, unique identifiers used with signal messages for a limited period of
time, to prevent long term tracking. But can attackers still attack vehicular privacy
even when vehicles employ a pseudonym change strategy? The major contribution
of this paper is a new attack model that uses long-distance pseudonym changing
and short-distance non-changing protocols to associate vehicles with their respective
pseudonyms.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to:
• Dr. Bruce DeBruhl for his guidance during this project.
• Sean Bayley, Atticus Liu, and Aaron Otis for their contributions to this project.
• Andrew Guenther, for uploading the LATEXtemplate

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ix

CHAPTER
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1

Social and Ethical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

1.2

Basic Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.3

Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

2.1

Pseudonym Change Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

2.2

Previous Attack Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

3 Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.1

Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.2

Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.3

Vehicle Simulation Model

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

3.4

Brief Overview of Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

3.4.1

D2D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

3.4.2

W2D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

3.4.3

WiFi Null Boosting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

4.1

Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

4.2

Attack Model Breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

4.3

DSRC-to-DSRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

4.3.1

Disassociations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

4.3.2

Same Listener Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

4.3.3

X2E Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

4.3.4

Transitive Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

WiFi-to-DSRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

4.4.1

53

4.4

Disassociations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

4.4.2

Known Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

4.4.3

Possible Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

4.4.4

WiFi Null Boosting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

4.5

Confidence Threshold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

4.6

Path Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

5 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

5.1

General Attack Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

5.2

Attack Across Different Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

5.3

Delta Tuning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

5.4

D2D Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

5.5

Weight Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

5.6

Path Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

6 Future Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

6.1

Expanding to k Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

6.2

∆ Tuning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

6.3

Confidence Threshold and Second Most Likely Candidate . . . . . . .

92

6.4

Distinguishing Vehicles Without WiFi Capability . . . . . . . . . . .

93

6.5

Optimal Listener Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table
5.1

Page
Radio Protocol Parameters for Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

70

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1.1

Initial D2D Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

1.2

Initial W2D Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

1.3

Example Disassociation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

1.4

Example Known Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

1.5

Example Possible Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

3.1

Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

3.2

Enter and Exit Events of Example Vehicle Path . . . . . . . . . . .

26

3.3

Weight Bipartite Graph constructed in X2E Attack . . . . . . . . .

27

4.1

Example of Observation Intervals Having Overlapping Time Intervals 36

4.2

Example of Boosting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39

5.1

Example SUMO map with listener placements, Map: Eichstätt . . .

72

5.2

Example SUMO map with listener placements, Map: Mions . . . .

73

5.3

Example SUMO map with listener placements, Map: Melun . . . .

73

5.4

Associations vs. Different Penetration Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

5.5

Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Different Penetration Rates .

79

5.6

Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Different Maps . . . . . . . .

81

5.7

Associations vs Delta Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

5.8

Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Delta Value . . . . . . . . . .

82

5.9

D2D Precision & Recall vs. D2D Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

5.10

Associations vs. D2D Strategy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

5.11

Average W2D Precision vs. D2D Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

5.12

Average W2D Recall vs. D2D Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

5.13

Associations vs. Weight Calculation

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

5.14

Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Weight Calculation . . . . . .

89

5.15

Reconstructed Path vs. Actual Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91

ix

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

With recent technological advances in intelligent transportation systems (ITS), Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) have seen expanded applications. VANETs are
systems of vehicles communicating with each other and roadside infrastructures. One
application for VANETs is Vehicle Safety Communication (VSC), which aim to enhance vehicle safety and the driving experience. VSC can be further broken down into
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. An example of V2V communication is platooning, where vehicles closely
follow other vehicles aided by wirelessly exchanging steering and acceleration information. Examples of V2I communication are automatic tollbooth payments, where
vehicles can automatically send their occupants’ payment information to tollbooths
without having to stop, and emergency roadside warnings, where roadside infrastructures can broadcast to vehicles information about upcoming dangerous weather and
road conditions [22]. Because VANETs use wireless technology for communication,
an attacker, an agent outside of the network, can easily pick up signal packets with
proper equipment [4, 13]. This brings into question whether a malicious attacker can
track users for an extended period of time using these messages, in what we refer to
as a tracking attack. A tracking attack would undermine vehicular security and be
an infringement upon user privacy.
One means of mitigating a tracking attack is using pseudonyms in VANET messages [12]. Pseudonyms are temporary unique identifiers used by vehicles when sending VSC messages that are switched regularly to prevent tracking over long periods of time. Pseudonyms are distributed to vehicles by a trusted third-party Certificate Authority (CA), with vehicles’ owners being associated with their vehicles’
1

pseudonyms, for liability reasons [20]. Requiring a CA instead of simply allowing
vehicles to generate their own pseudonyms ensures authenticity, prevents pseudonym
spoofing, and mitigates pseudonym collisions. Pseudonym spoofing is when a node
alters its pseudonym to pose as another user. Pseudonym collisions are when two vehicles have the same pseudonym. While a simple strategy for protecting user privacy
in VANETS is to frequently switch pseudonyms, this is not an ideal solution because
pseudonym changes are expensive [16]. The cost for changing pseudonyms comes
from the limited number of pseudonyms a vehicle can store and the expense, or impossibility, of downloading new pseudonyms. To most effectively change pseudonyms,
research has been done into pseudonym change strategies, or algorithms that determine when to best change pseudonyms. I discuss a number of pseudonym change
strategies in Chapter 2. While pseudonym change strategies aim to maximize the
utility of each pseudonym change, they do not guarantee preserving user privacy.
While previous attacks have been devised to test the effectiveness of user privacy
enhancing technologies, they have focused only on single radio systems, systems that
assume the usage of or are only concerned with a single radio protocol. I propose
that a malicious attacker can develop a more effective attack by combining multiple
attack vectors leveraging available information that current attacks do not consider.
Previous works have all assumed a single radio, but with modern technology, many
vehicles are equipped with many radios that are used for different purposes. Therefore, in this work, I develop a generalizable privacy attack that targets two common
radio protocols used by vehicles in VANETs, long-distance pseudonym changing protocol and short-distance non-changing protocol. This attack can be used by a passive
adversary to attack vehicular privacy. In my attack, I deanonymize vehicles by associating signals’ pseudonyms to each other, that is to accurately predict when two
signals originate from the same vehicle. This information is then used to recreate a
vehicle’s path, thus tracking the vehicle over an extended period of time.
2

I use the general long-distance pseudonym changing and short-distance non-changing
protocol types because of their common analogies in commodity systems. Examples of long-distance pseudonym changing radio protocols are Dedicated Short Range
Communication (DSRC) and 5G, and examples of short-distance non-changing signal
protocols are WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee, and tire-pressure monitoring systems. I use
DSRC and WiFi in my experiments due to their widespread usage in modern vehicles, but the attack can be altered to use any signals of the two types. Using both
radio protocols allows me to uniquely identify vehicles as well as expand my area of
knowledge of the identified vehicles. I use the short-distance non-changing signal protocol to uniquely identify vehicles within my attack area, and I use the long-distance
pseudonym changing protocol due to its greater range and area of effect to expand
my knowledge of vehicles’ locations once I have associated signals to each other.
I use SUMO (Simulation of Urban Mobility) [2], an open source simulation package
commonly used to simulate realistic road traffic for academic purposes, to simulate
vehicle traffic in three real-world maps. I then place listeners throughout the maps to
simulate an attacker placing real listeners to eavesdrop on signal packets. My listeners
gather signal packets based on the SUMO vehicle simulations, from which I attack
vehicular privacy by associating identifiers and pseudonyms seen by my listeners.
I attack a number of realistic vehicle traffic simulations and present my findings
in Chapter 5. For WiFi-to-DSRC associations, my attack model achieved around
an 80% average precision and 20% average recall per vehicle. For DSRC-to-DSRC
associations, my attack model consistently achieved at least a 96% precision and
between 18% to 38% recall depending on the map.

3

1.1

Social and Ethical Implications

The social implications of vehicle tracking is a debate of weighing economical benefits
and safety versus privacy. One application of vehicle tracking is as evidence in court
cases and insurance claims. With vehicle tracking, law enforcement can more accurately track suspicious vehicles without having to spend the extensive resources that
are required in previously conventional means of tracking such as stakeouts, collecting
traffic camera footage, and tailing vehicles. Tracking vehicles can also help resolve
insurance claims. If there is a log of a vehicle’s exact location at any given time,
one can figure out definitively which party is at fault in what would otherwise be an
ambiguous car accident.
While VANET messages can be used to help law enforcement in criminal cases
and insurance liability claims, a malicious adversary with the proper equipment can
attempt the same tracking. These forms of tracking violate the contextual integrity
of VANET messages. Contextual integrity is a theory of privacy proposed by Helen
Nissenbaum that defines privacy as the appropriate flow of information based on
contextual norms [14, 15]. In contextual integrity, norms of appropriateness dictate
what information about a person is appropriate, or fitting, to reveal in a particular
context. Norms of distribution dictate how that information is shared based on
particular context. While it can be argued that the ability to track vehicles is already
available through the use of publicly available cameras, the majority of people are not
actively concerned with the cameras’ presence due to the services they provide [25]
and the belief that they, the individual, is not of enough particular interest to be
tracked [14]. However, the ability of a malicious attacker to track a vehicle and its
passengers over an extended period of time is a violation of the norms of distribution
and appropriateness, as most people do not expect to be tracked. It can also be
argued that, when users willingly participate in and use VANET technology, they
4

are entrusting their information to those that develop the technology. Not effectively
safeguarding this information or defending against attacks that undermine their users’
privacy would be a breach of this trust by the developers with their users.
Even with regards of legal monitoring, there is what is known as the “chilling
effect.” The chilling effect is when people do less of something, even if it is a normal,
legal activity, due to the fear of being monitored, regardless of if they are actually
being monitored or not. Simply the potential for a tracking attack can be an infringement upon the freedom of people to openly travel and partake in activities.

1.2

Basic Attack Model

For my attack, I assume the role of a passive attacker, as opposed to an online or
real-time attacker. Passive attackers collect data, then attack the system afterwards.
Online or real-time attackers are able to attack the system as they are collecting data.
I gather signal packets from listeners that have been placed throughout the area of
observation, working under the assumption that the only information I can gather is
the identifier or pseudonym associated with a signal message, not any of the message
content or location data. I then try to associate the identifiers and pseudonyms that I
have seen to those that originate from the same vehicle by constructing two association
matrices. I assume easy access to the message pseudonyms due to safety messages
being unencrypted because they do not contain any sensitive information[19]. Safety
messages also often contain vital information that can prevent immediate threats
such as collision avoidance. Therefore, the overhead of establishing a secure protocol
between communicating vehicles is often considered too expensive.
The first matrix associates pseudonyms to other pseudonyms. I conclude that for
any pair of pseudonyms they are disassociated, associated, possibly associated, or that
I do not have enough information to draw a conclusion about the relationship between
5

Figure 1.1: Initial D2D Matrix
the pair. If two pseudonyms are seen in different locations at the same point in time,
then I conclude that they are disassociated. If a pseudonym appears immediately after
another pseudonym disappears, I hypothesize that a vehicle changed its pseudonym
while in my area of observation, and therefore the two pseudonyms are associated.
Next, I try to match enter events to their corresponding exit events, where enter and
exit events are vehicles entering or exiting my area of observation, respectively, to try
and associate pseudonyms. Finally, I apply the transitive property across the matrix,
extending disassociations and associations, but not possible associations. Figure 1.1
illustrates the initialization of the D2D matrix.
The second matrix contains the probabilities between identifiers to pseudonyms
associations. The matrix is a stochastic matrix where each element contains the

6

Figure 1.2: Initial W2D Matrix
probability that the identifier and the pseudonym that its row and column correspond
to, respectively, are associated. The matrix is also a left stochastic matrix, meaning
that each column sums to one because they represent pseudonyms. Since identifiers
are non-changing, and each vehicle can only have one identifier and pseudonyms are
changing, an identifier can be associated with many pseudonyms, while a pseudonym
can only be associated with a single identifier. That is why columns, which represent
pseudonyms, sum to one. I initialize each element to be

1
N +1

where N is the number of

identifiers observed, that is each pseudonym is initially equally likely to be associated
to any identifier. Figure 1.2 illustrates the initialization of the W2D matrix.
I then find disassociation using the same method of finding disassociations that
is used in the first matrix construction. An identifier and a pseudonym are found to

7

Figure 1.3: Example Disassociation
be disassociated if they are seen by different listeners at the same point in time. An
example of this is illustrated in Figure 1.3. I set the probability of the disassociated
identifier-pseudonym pair, that is, the element in the matrix representing the pair,
to be zero, and distributing its original value among the other elements in that row,
thus increasing those probabilities and maintaining the column sum of one.

Figure 1.4: Example Known Association

Next, I find known associations, that is, associations that are so likely to be
correct, that I consider them to be correct. If an identifier and a pseudonym are seen
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together at the same listener, at the same time, and no other pseudonyms are around,
then the pair is considered to be associated. I set their probability to one, as well as
all other probabilities in that column to be zero. If an identifier and a pseudonym
are seen by the same listener and at the same time, then I say that they are seen
together or that one is seen with the other.

Figure 1.5: Example Possible Associations

I then find possible associations, that is, associations that are not guaranteed to
be correct as known associations, but still likely. There are three levels of possible
associations, with the first level being the most likely associations, and subsequent
levels being less likely. The first level of possible associations is between pairs of
identifiers and pseudonyms where the identifier is seen with the pseudonym, but
other pseudonyms are also present at that listener; an example of this is illustrated
in Figure 1.5. The second level of possible association between an identifier and a
pseudonym is when the identifier is seen with a pseudonym that is associated with the
pseudonym in question. The third level of possible association between an identifier
and a pseudonym is when the identifier is seen with a pseudonym that is possibly associated with the pseudonym in question. The second and third level associations use
pseudonym-to-pseudonym associations from the previously constructed pseudonymto-pseudonym matrix.

9

I also try to find pseudonyms originating from vehicles that do not support the
short-distance non-changing protocol. I do this on the proposition that a pseudonym
seen without any overlapping identifier is more likely to originate from a vehicle
without a short-distance non-changing protocol than a pseudonym that is seen with
an overlapping identifier.
Finally, I use a confidence threshold value to determine which associations I am
considering to be actual associations. Association with a probability greater than
the confidence threshold I deem to be actual associations. The found associations
are then used to recreate vehicles’ paths by drawing a Euclidian path between the
listeners where the vehicle was seen at.

1.3

Contributions

To summarize, I make the following contributions in this thesis:
• An attack model that leverages two radio protocols to deanonmiyze vehicles
by associating unique identifiers with temporaroy pseudonyms and temporary
pseudonyms with other temporary pseudonyms, regardless of radio market penetration rates.
• A Euclidian path reconstruction method using associations found by the attack
model.
• Tunable and configurable parameters that allow the attack model to be applicable across different scenarios.
• A more effective weight calculation than previous research when constructing
the weighted bipartite graph in the Exit-to-Enter Attack, as well as addition of
a maximum weight threshold to filter out less likely associations.

10

Chapter 2
RELATED WORKS

This project expands on previous works that investigated the possibility and effectiveness of tracking wireless devices and vehicles using the beacon messages transmitted
periodically by the tracking targets. Recent works showed that an attacker can track
many mobile devices with accuracy comparable to GPS and provide high-accuracy
trajectory information by simply using inexpensive off-the-shelf equipment [4, 13].
Furthermore, it has been suggested that vehicles’ tire pressure monitoring systems
(TPMS) contain vulnerabilities that would allow an attacker to perform similar tracking attacks on vehicles [8]. This is of particular interest to me because my project
involves using existing built-in vehicle technology protocols to perform tracking attacks.

2.1

Pseudonym Change Strategies

Because of the concern of vehicle tracking through the use of V2X protocols, there
have been a number of works exploring effective means of defending against such attacks. A key means of defending against vehicle tracking is the use of pseudonyms [17].
A pseudonym is a unique identifier associated with a signal emitted by a vehicle to
allow unique identification for a period of time, as some signal usages require identification, but also changed periodically to prevent long-term tracking. The simple
strategy for protecting privacy in VANETs by frequently changing pseudonym is not
ideal because pseudonym changes are expensive due to limited vehicle pseudonym
storage capacities, limited download capabilities for new pseudonyms, and increased
costs on various applications [17, 20]. Vehicles are equipped with a set of pseudonyms

11

distributed by a trusted Certificate Authority, and either cycle through and re-use
pseudonyms or have to acquire new pseudonyms from the CA [11]. Therefore, effective pseudonym change strategies, algorithms that dictate when a vehicle changes
pseudonyms, have been developed to maximize the effectiveness of each pseudonym
change, while minimizing the number of changes required.
My experiments use traffic simulations where vehicles employ a periodic change
strategy, in which the signal protocols dictate how often a vehicle broadcasts a message (heart-rate) and changes its pseudonym (change-rate), with all vehicles having
the same heart-rate and change-rate if they are using the same protocol. This change
strategy is simple and does not require cooperation among neighboring vehicles to
coordinate pseudonym changes, which prevents malicious adversaries to disrupt privacy gains of pseudonym changes by vehicles within the VANET, a topic which has
been investigated in graduate student Nicholas Plewtong’s thesis paper [18].
Another pseudonym change strategy is a synchronous change strategy [12]. The
synchronous change strategy can be classified as a type of a position change strategy,
where vehicles change pseudonyms when a minimum threshold of vehicle density
within their proximity is met. The synchronous change strategy requires coordination
among the vehicles in the VANET to maximize effectiveness of pseudonym changes.
Vehicles that change pseudonyms together would prove to be more difficult for an
attacker to associate their new pseudonyms to their respective old pseudonyms due
to the lack of distinguishing features and increased number of possible association
pairs. The synchronous change strategy has vehicles ready to change pseudonyms cmin
seconds after their last change. Vehicles indicate their readiness to change by setting a
change flag within their broadcast messages. A change is triggered when there are k –
1 other vehicles with their change flag set within the transmission range. This allows
for a synchronous pseudonym change by all vehicles ready to change pseudonyms
within that given area. If the threshold of k – 1 vehicles is not met within cmax
12

seconds after the last change, then the vehicle changes pseudonyms anyways. This is
to prevent vehicles from perpetually waiting for the number of vehicles threshold to
be met in sparse areas or in areas where this strategy has not been adopted [12]. On
its own without the necessary modifications, the synchronous change strategy would
be susceptible to malicious adversaries posing as compliant vehicles nodes that aim
to disrupt the vehicular privacy of nodes within the VANET [18]. A similar change
strategy called the density-based location privacy scheme has also been proposed that
uses the same concept of changing pseudonyms when enough other vehicles are within
proximity to make old-new pseudonym associations more difficult [23].
Another type of position change algorithm is a similar status algorithm. In a
similar status algorithm, vehicles coordinate pseudonym changes by looking for other
vehicles with a similar status as their own, with a pseudonym change occurring when
a given number of vehicles with a similar status are within proximity of a respective
vehicle. This strategy allows for many different things to be considered features of a
vehicle’s status such as speed, direction, and number of neighbors [7]. However, this
strategy requires the broadcasting of additional descriptive information about the
vehicle, which can be used by adversaries to further distinguish vehicles from each
other [5].
AMOEBA is another means of defending user privacy that takes advantage of
the clustering nature VANETs to prevent malicious attackers [21]. While not a
pseudonym change strategy, AMOEBA is a privacy scheme that employs the use of
pseudonyms, namely a single group pseudonym representative of all vehicles within
a given cluster. Groups are formed by vehicles that move with a similar velocity and
relative to each other, and have a fully connected network graph within them to allow
for communication among their respective members. A leader of the group is elected
at random and broadcasts on behalf of the group members, while other members
can remain silent. AMOEBA also defines the use of silent periods to prevent linka13

bility between two locatable broadcasts. Random silent periods are used to prevent
trackability. An example would be if a vehicle changes its pseudonym from A to A’.
Initially entering a network and broadcasting as A, after having changed and waited
a random silent period, it begins broadcasting as A’. If another vehicle had changed
pseudonyms from B to B’ within that silent period, an attacker may be misled to
tracking the neighboring vehicle.

2.2

Previous Attack Models

A common attack used to quantitatively compare pseudonym and tracking related
defenses is trying to match enter events with their respective exit events [6, 3]. Enter
and exit events represent when a vehicle enters or exits a mix zone, respectively. A
mix zone is an area outside of an attacker’s area of observation, where vehicles can
become mixed together without an attacker’s knowledge.
The premise of this attack is to match corresponding enter and exit events using
previously learned data. The attack is broken into two phases, a learning phase and an
attack phase. During the learning phase, the attacker records the number of vehicles
that travel between two areas of observation and the average time each vehicle took
to make that respective trip. The data learned is limited to what can be learned from
observing pseudonyms for the pseudonym’s given lifespan, that is, the time before the
vehicle changes pseudonyms. This means that due to vehicles changing pseudonyms,
the number of vehicles recorded to have traveled between two locations can be greater
than the actual number of vehicles. During the attack phase, the attack first actively
attempts an online attack to match each newly observed exit event to a previously
observed enter event. This step simply matches events if they broadcast the same
pseudonyms and removes the events from the set of events that are used later. After,
all unmatched events are used to create a bipartite graph, with the two distinct sets
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being exit and enter events. Edges are assigned between an exit and an enter event
with a weight equal to the number of vehicles that traveled between the two points
where the events were observed divided by the average time each vehicle took. A
penalty is added the farther the actual trip time was from the average trip time. If
during the learning phase, no trip was recorded between the two locations, then a
small weight of 0.1 is given. When the bipartite graph is complete, the solution is a
matter of solving the linear sum problem and getting a minimal cost perfect match of
the graph. The success of the attack is measured by how many pairs of events were
correctly matched.
I use this attack as the basis for one source of information gathering when constructing my pseudonym-to-pseudonym association matrix. Note that their definitions of exit and enter events are the reverse of my usage of the terms in later chapters
when discussing my attack model. I define enter and exit events as when a vehicle
enters or exits my area of observation (i.e., exits or enters the mix zone), as opposed
to when a vehicle enters or exits the mix zone. I go into more detail about the improvements I add to this attack and how I use the gathered information in Chapter 3
and Chapter 4.
Attacks have also been developed that take advantage of specific message protocol features. In Examining Privacy in Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks, the authors
break down the privacy vulnerabilities of the DSRC protocol stack [5]. Within SAE
J2735, the standard message structure for DSRC messages, a vehicle is identified by a
4-byte temporary identifier pseudonym, while also broadcasting information such as
the vehicle’s GPS coordinates, motion information, and vehicle size that can be seen
by anyone. The authors argue that DSRC messages leak enough information that an
attacker can circumvent the temporary nature of the pseudonym and track vehicles
despite switching pseudonyms, as well as linking pseudonyms to the actual vehicle
or owner. The authors claim that attackers can use statistical methods, similar to
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my attack, to track vehicles regardless of pseudonym switches. The main means of
doing so is when a vehicle switches pseudonyms, an attacker will see a pseudonym
no longer transmitting, and a new pseudonym begins transmitting within close proximity. The effectiveness of this attack increases with greater coverage and can also
take advantage of the descriptive information contained in DSRC messages to better associate pseudonyms in the case of multiple vehicles simultaneously switching
pseudonyms. I use a similar method in one of my matrix constructions, but I am
limited to the pseudonym information of a new pseudonym appearing shortly after
an old pseudonym disappears. The authors then claim that by using this location
information, attackers can link pseudonyms back to the vehicle owners. Aside from
the direct linkage of pseudonyms to their owners by gaining access to the pseudonym
database, an attacker can use the location information to build a profile for certain
vehicles. Knowing where vehicles stop and go at what times, an attacker can correlate
points of interest to buildings and times visited to possibly discover where the user
works and lives. After narrowing down buildings, an attacker can further pinpoint the
user by performing a lookup of owners and occupants of the buildings for residency
and employee directories for businesses in that area.
The authors describe a more general version of the previously mentioned synchronous pseudonym strategy [12] as an effective pseudonym change strategy to prevent tracking, although the use of a similar status algorithm [7] would likely be even
more effective, as DSRC messages already contain descriptive information about a
vehicle. They also cite the use of a group pseudonym as a means of defending privacy [21], though they do note that an attacker can attack the point when a vehicle
leaves a cluster and enters a new one to learn information.
An attack developed by the authors of [24] aims to associate a large set of collected
anonymous location samples to anonymous location profiles using the established
Multiple Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) algorithm to track vehicles’ locations over an
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extended period of time. MHT addresses the data association problem by generating
a set of data associations hypotheses every time a new set of measurements arrives,
with each hypothesis being a possible association of a measurement with a target. The
probability for each hypothesis to be correct is calculated and the highest probability
is chosen to be the solution. MHT relies on Kalman filters [9] to estimate the state
variables of each target: position and velocity. This attack assumes the role of a
passive attacker with perfect eavesdropping capabilities, where an attacker receives
all beacon messages sent over the network. They assume that vehicles broadcast their
location and velocity at regular intervals, but with pseudonyms that change for every
packet to completely anonymize the transmissions. Their experiments showed that
at high beaconing rates of a beacon a second or faster and less than 100 vehicles,
they were able to track vehicles for on average 800 out of the 1000 seconds in their
simulations. Increasing the vehicle density to be between 100 and 250 vehicles saw
the average tracking time drop to 700 seconds. A beaconing rate of a beacon every
two seconds sees an average of less than 400 seconds of tracking when there are even
50 vehicles, and a drop to 150 seconds when there are 100 vehicles. Beaconing rates
slower than a beacon every two seconds only saw tracking of 100 seconds when there
were less than 25 vehicles in the system, and there was no substantial tracking after
50 vehicles. Their attack is also dependent on accurate position information. When
they introduce random noise into the gathered position information, a random offset
anywhere between one to five meters decreased tracking by 200 down to 700 seconds.
They also explore the effectiveness of their tracking with varying equipment rates.
They actually see an increase in average tracking time, up to nearly 900 seconds
when the equipment rate is between 10 and 20%. This is due the much smaller
number of vehicles being tracked, as they can only track equipped vehicles, and lower
equipment rates mean the likelihood of equipped vehicles crossing paths is less likely.
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While I also assume the role of a passive attacker, my attack does not assume
perfect eavesdropping capabilities, only receiving packets within the range of listeners placed, nor do I assume the ability to gather location and velocity information
from signal packets, simply the pseudonyms associated with the packets. In my simulation, I also use a periodic change strategy that changes pseudonyms periodically,
as opposed to per packet, as pseudonym changes can be expensive, thus this is a
more likely employed strategy. I also explore the effects of varying equipment rates
(called penetration rates in my scenarios) in my experiments, but because I am gathering multiple protocols information (long-distance pseudonym changing and shortdistance non-changing), vehicles not equipped with the short-distance non-changing
equipment continue to emit long-distance pseudonym changing protocol signals introducing noise into the information gathered when trying to associate signals. The
results of my experiments with varying penetration rates can be found in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
DESIGN

In this chapter, I describe the design of the attack model I use to deanomyize vehicles
and undermine their privacy by associating DSRC pseudonyms with their corresponding WiFi identifiers. This chapter outlines overall goals of the attack, requirements
of the model, the traffic simulations used, and a brief design overview of the attack
model. In Chapter 4, I go into more detail about the attack model implementation.

3.1

Goals

The primary goal of my attack is to correctly associate identifiers with their respective
pseudonyms. This information will ultimately be used to attack users’ privacy by
allowing attackers to track users over an extended period of time by recreating users’
paths based on the locations where signals with their identifiers or pseudonyms were
seen.

3.2

Requirements

In this section, I detail the necessary system requirements for the attack model. The
following are formal requirements the attack model maintains:
• The model is module and can be generalized to any long-distance pseudonym
changing signal and short-distance non-changing signal configurations, and listener placement configuration.
• The model can be used on a system with varying identifier penetration rates.
• The model can quantitatively evaluate the success of its attack.
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The attack model attacks vehicular privacy of nodes within a VANET system using a long-distance pseudonym changing protocol and a short-distance non-changing
protocol. The model must not be constrained to specific signal types for either protocol. Thus, the range, heart rate, and change rate of the signals can be adjusted
within the attack model to accommodate different signal types. The model must also
be able to perform with varying listener placement configurations. I also design the
attack model to perform with varying listener placement configurations to make it applicable to multiple scenarios. While the attack model benefits greatly from a greater
number of listeners and a listener placement combination that maximizes the number
of signal packets gathered, I show that it does not require the optimal listener placement configuration to produce substantial results. This is applicable in a real-world
situation where attackers may not be able to place listeners in optimal locations nor
know the optimal locations, or if attackers are interested in vehicles traveling to a specific location. Note that my attack assumes non-overlapping listener coverage. That
is, listeners do not overlap in their listening range, thus a broadcast only be picked
up by at most one listener. While this is not required, I chose this assumption to
lower the complexity of my model. Although some areas of the attack model require
knowing if vehicles were at different listeners at a given time, this information can
be determined by keeping track of which listeners overlap in coverage. Furthermore,
overlapping listener coverage could potentially provide more useful information, such
as a basic form of triangulation by using the overlapping coverage area to further
narrow down the exact location of a vehicle as opposed to using an entire listener’s
range, or using the overlapping coverage area as another region in conjunction with
the corresponding listeners’ non-overlapping areas.
Another requirement is that the attack model must still be relatively successful
regardless of radio market penetration rate, that is, the percentage of vehicles within
the VANET system that support a given signal type. This is important because
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there are some real-world scenarios where not all vehicles in the area of observation
will support all signal types. Therefore, not requiring all vehicles within the VANET
system to have both signal types makes my attack more broadly applicable to a
realistic scenario.
The final requirement is that I must be able to quantitatively measure the success
of my attack to allow for input parameter tuning and to conclude whether my attack
was successful. This also allows us to compare my attack results against other known
attacks [6, 3, 5, 24].

3.3

Vehicle Simulation Model

For my experiments, I use a DSRC signal for the long-distance pseudonym changing
signal and a WiFi protocol signal for the short-distance non-changing signal. The
DSRC protocol signal has a range of 100 meters, a heart rate of 0.1 seconds, and
change frequency of 30 seconds. The WiFi protocol has a range of 25 meters and a
heart rate of 30 seconds. While I use DSRC and WiFi, the range, heart rates, and
change frequency of either protocol can be configured to emulate other signal types.
For listener placement, I use a handpicked approach where I manually select and
place listeners at locations with a large amount of vehicle traffic to increase the
number of radio packets gathered [5]. I also ensure that listeners do not overlap in
coverage, as my attack methods work under the assumption that listeners’ coverages
are disjoint. While listener placement can be optimized using techniques such as a
genetic algorithm to find the optimal listener placement combination that maximizes
the number of packets gathered, and there is a separate Cal Poly student project
that explores this option, maximum packet gathering is not the goal of this attack.
Therefore, a handpicked listener placement technique is adequate for my attack. This
also provides a realistic scenario, where an attacker can simply set up listeners at lo21

cations where they know to have the most traffic or locations that they are specifically
interested in.
I use SUMO [2] to simulate realistic traffic on a number of real-world maps, as
opposed to research that uses grids in their experiments [6]. Using the DSRC and
WiFi protocols as my two signal types, I then run simulations using the vehicles
paths generated by SUMO with varying degrees of WiFi penetration rates, that is
a percentage of my vehicles will support both WiFi and DSRC protocols, while the
rest will only support DSRC; my simulations maintain a 100% DSRC penetration
rate. I choose a 100% DSRC penetration rate because of its many VSC usages.
Therefore, it is likely to be federally mandated in the future. Furthermore, while my
simulation maintains a 100% DSRC penetration rate, it is not required, as WiFi is the
unique identifier of vehicles and DSRC pseudonyms simply help to expand our area of
knowledge from created associations. Results of my experiments running the attack
without any DSRC-to-DSRC associations illustrate this idea in Chapter 5. Varying
WiFi penetration rates serve to illustrate the effectiveness of the attack, regardless
of penetration rate and is representative of a real-world scenario, as some vehicles
may not support all protocols. Lower WiFi penetration rates are theoretically more
difficult to attack, as I leverage the WiFi identifiers to uniquely identify vehicles
and determine the number of vehicles. DSRC packets received from vehicles without
WiFi capability are essentially noise in the system, as I have no way of identifying
the vehicle they originated from, but the attack model still tries to associate them to
WiFi identifiers, as I do not know if a DSRC packet originated from a vehicle with
or without WiFi capability. Using the SUMO generated traffic simulations, I step
through each vehicle’s path, stopping at intervals in accordance to the two signal
protocol heart rates and simulate a signal broadcast. A broadcast is simulated by
checking if any listener is within the broadcast range of a vehicle when it broadcasts
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a signal and recording that the listener, if within range, received a packet tagged with
the respective signal’s pseudonym or identifier at the given time.

3.4

Brief Overview of Attack Model

Figure 3.1: Attack Model
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The attack is divided into the construction of two association matrices: DSRC-toDSRC (D2D) and WiFi-to-DSRC (W2D). The D2D matrix is an MxM matrix, where
M is the number of DSRC pseudonyms observed by listeners and is used in a transitive
property manner when creating WiFi-to-DSRC associations and disassociations in
the W2D matrix construction. The W2D matrix is an (N + 1)xM matrix, where
N is the number of WiFi identifiers observed by listeners. I add an extra row to
the W2D matrix that represents all vehicles without WiFi capability, dubbed WiFi
Null. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the initialization of the D2D matrix and W2D matrix,
respectively. When making WiFi-to-DSRC associations, note that WiFi identifiers
have a one-to-many relationship with DSRC pseudonyms, where a WiFi identifier can
be associated with many DSRC pseudonyms, but a DSRC pseudonym can only be
associated with a single WiFi identifier. DSRC pseudonyms have a many-to-many
relationship with other DSRC pseudony, where a DSRC pseudonym can be associated
with many other DSRC pseudonyms. Furthermore, if the WiFi penetration rate is
lower than 100%, then some DSRC pseudonyms cannot be correctly associated to
any WiFi identifier, as some pseudonyms will originate from a vehicle without WiFi
capability. In the remainder of this section, I explain the different steps involved in
the construction of each matrix. I design the attack model to be modular such that
steps can be added to or removed from either matrix constructions if new research
conceives new attacks that can be incorporated into the attack model. Results of my
experiments using different configurations of the D2D matrix construction illustrates
this idea and can be found in Chapter 5.

3.4.1

D2D

Within the D2D matrix, for any pair of DSRC pseudonyms my attack will conclude
that the two pseudonyms are: disassociated, associated, possibly associated, or that
there was not enough information to make a conclusion. The D2D matrix construction
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is broken into four steps: finding disassociations, the Same Listener Attack, the Exitto-Enter (X2E) Attack, and applying the transitive property to disassociations and
associations. These steps are illustrated in Figure 3.1.
The first method that I use labels a pair of DSRC pseudonyms to be disassociated.
A pair of pseudonyms are labeled as disassociated when the pseudonyms are seen at
different listeners in an overlapping time interval. Because pseudonyms are assumed
to be unique across all vehicles, a vehicle can only use one pseudonym at a time,
and listeners do not have overlapping coverage, two pseudonyms can be labeled as
disassociated if they are observed at different locations at the same point in time.
An example of this is illustrated in Figure 1.3, where d1 and d2 are seen at different
locations at the same time, therefore d1 and d2 are disassociated.
The next method, dubbed the Same Listener Attack, finds DSRC-to-DSRC associations. In the Same Listener Attack, I look for a pseudonym that is first seen
immediately after another pseudonym is last seen. If both observations occur at the
same listener, then there is a high probability these observations can be explained as
the originating vehicle changing pseudonyms while still in the range of the listener.
Therefore, I am able to, with high precision, associate the two observed pseudonyms
to each other. This type of attack was previously described in [5].
The next method, dubbed the Exit-to-Enter (X2E ) Attack, finds DSRC-to-DSRC
associations and possible associations. This attack is an extension of the method
used in [6, 3]. Enter and exit events are defined as when a vehicle enters or exits my
area of observation, respectively. Examples of enter and exit events are illustrated
in Figure 3.2. This method is broken up into two phases: a learning phase and an
attack phase. During the learning phase, I observe the number of vehicles that go
between any two pairs of listeners, and the average time each vehicle took to make
that trip. The attack phase then tries to match enter events to their respective
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Figure 3.2: Enter and Exit Events of Example Vehicle Path
preceding exit events by constructing a bipartite graph with exit events in one set
and enter events in the other. Edges are assigned from an exit event to an enter
events with a weight determined by the previously learned information. Note that I
use negatively weighted edges, that is, the edges that are more likely to be correct
connections between an exit and an enter event have lower valued weights than edges
corresponding to less likely correct connections. An example bipartite graph is shown
in Figure 3.3. I then solve the minimum weight matching or linear assignment problem
on the graph. The linear sum problem is a combinatorial optimization problem that
finds the minimum weighted perfect matching of a weighted bipartite graph. That is,
the goal is to find the minimum sum of weights of edges while having each item on
one side of the bipartite graph assigned to only a single item on the other side of the
graph. I use negative weights due to Python’s NumPy package having a function that
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solves minimum weight matching, but not maximum weight matching. Then I take
each in the solved graph, and if its weight is a percentage of the maximum weight
recorded within the graph, then I set the edge’s corresponding enter and exit events’
pseudonyms to be associated. If the edge’s weight does not meet this criterion, then
I set the two pseudonyms as a possible association. The effectiveness of this method
is affected by listener placements. I saw that when listeners are placed near each
other in high traffic locations and not spread throughout the area of attack, this
method yields little to no data, most likely due to all edges being of equal weights
(i.e., vehicles are equally likely to travel from any one listener to any other listener).
Therefore, solving the minimum weight sum of the bipartite graph has extremely low
precision. The relationship between this attack method and listener placements is not
the focus of this project, therefore I do not look into what sorts of listener placement
configurations maximize the efficacy of this attack method.

Figure 3.3: Weight Bipartite Graph constructed in X2E Attack
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Finally, the transitive property is applied across the D2D matrix. That is, if d1
is associated to d2 , and d2 is associated to d3 , then all three pseudonyms are said
to be associated to each other. I apply the transitive property only on disassociations and associations and not possible associations because through my experiments
the high uncertainty of possible associations caused a cascading number of incorrect
associations when a single incorrect association bridged two association groups.
The D2D matrix is then used in the W2D matrix construction. It is used in a transitive property manner in creating WiFi-to-DSRC disassociations and associations.
For example, if DSRC pseudonyms d1 and d2 are associated, and WiFi identifier w1
is associated to d1 , then w1 is also associated to d2 .

3.4.2

W2D

Within the W2D matrix, the element at row i and column j (denoted as elementij )
contains the probability that WiFi identifier wi is associated to DSRC pseudonym dj .
Note that, since DSRC pseudonyms can only be associated to a single WiFi identifier,
each column within the matrix sums to one and are mathematically independent
of each other. Also, since a WiFi identifier can be associated with many DSRC
pseudonyms, rows can sum to any arbitrary value. When wi and dj are said to be
seen together, or that wi is seen with dj , it means that they were seen by the same
listener with an overlapping time interval.
When updating W2D probabilities, I employ a method I have dubbed boosting
multiple times. Boosting is a method done in terms of a given DSRC pseudonym,
where I take a portion of some elements in the pseudonym’s corresponding column
and redistribute them among elements in the same column due to having information
that implies that the boosted elements should have a higher value, that is the WiFiDSRC pairs that the boosted elements represent are more likely to be associated than
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the pairs represented by elements not being boosted. Boosting is done within each
DSRC column independently. Thus, a single boosting event for a pseudonym only
affects elements in the corresponding matrix column. Therefore, I say that for a given
DSRC pseudonym dj , I boost all WiFi signifiers wi in set W , where W is the set of
WiFi signifiers that I have concluded to be likely associated to dj , and take the boost
from WiFi signifiers wk in set W 0 , where W is the set of WiFi signifiers that are less
likely to be associated to dj . Note that W 0 is not necessarily simply Wall − W where
Wall is the set of all WiFi signifiers that I have observed. I define the total sum of the
values for W 0 to be Σ, and ∆ to be the redistribution factor, that is the percentage
taken from Σ to be redistributed to the boosted values. When boosting, for each
column, each element corresponding to identifiers in W 0 will be reduced by (1- ∆)
(multiplication) and each element corresponding to identifiers in W will be increased
by ∆ ∗ Σ (addition). An example illustration of boosting can be found in Figure 4.2
where for d1 I boost w1 , w2 , and w3 , while taking the boost from w4 and w5 . Tuning
the redistribution factor using methods, such as machine learning, can increase the
effectiveness of the attack model, but it is outside of the scope this project.
Each element is initialized to be equal to

1
,
N +1

where N is the number of WiFi

identifiers that I have observed, that is, each DSRC pseudonym is initially equally
likely to be associated to any WiFi identifier. I then find WiFi-DSRC disassociations.
The same criteria for disassociation from the D2D matrix creation are used here. A
WiFi identifier and a DSRC pseudonym are found to be disassociated if they are
seen at different listeners while having an overlapping time interval. When a WiFi
identifier wi is found to be disassociated from DSRC dj , then elementij ’s value is set
to zero, and its original value is distributed among all other elements within column j
whose current value does not equal zero. This redistribution represents when a DSRC
pseudonym is found to not possibly be associated to a given WiFi identifier. In this
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case, the likelihood that the pseudonym is associated to any other WiFi identifier
increases.
Next, I find known associations between a WiFi identifier wi and a DSRC pseudonym
dj . The criteria for a known association are that wi and dj are seen together and there
are no other pseudonyms seen during that time. While theoretically this method may
associate some pairs that are not actually associated, my experiments have found that
it is a simple approach that yields a fairly large number of true-positive associations
with high precision. When a known association is found between wi and dj , elementij
is set to one and all other elements in column j are set to zero. Each elementij is set
to 0, where dj’ is each pseudonym disassociated to dj . Their original values are redistributed among all other elements in their respective columns that do not currently
equal zero.
I then find possible associations between a WiFi identifier wi and a DSRC pseudonym
dj . Possible associations are incorporated into the W2D matrix through the use of
boosting. There are three levels of possible associations, each with their own boosting phase, where subsequent levels are less likely, and therefore will receive a smaller
boost than preceding layers. In my current attack model, each level uses a different
redistribution factor ∆. As noted before, these redistribution factors can be tuned to
maximize effectiveness, but generally I saw that using a larger ∆ in the second level
and a smaller ∆ in the last level yielded more favorable results than using the same
∆ across all levels.
The first set of possible associations is associations between wi and dj where
wi was seen with dj , but there were other pseudonyms also seen at the same time.
Therefore, if W is the set of all WiFi signifiers seen with a DSRC pseudonym dj , then
dj is equally likely to be associated to any signifiers in W , given that dj is only seen
with each signifier in W once. I also consider the number of times dj is seen with wi .
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That is, if dj is seen with wi twice and wk once, then elementij should get twice the
amount of boost as elementkj . For a given pseudonym dj , I boost all identifiers in
W , where W is the set of all WiFi identifiers seen with dj and take the boost from
W 0 , where W 0 is the set of all WiFi signifiers not seen with dj .
The second set of possible associations uses DSRC-to-DSRC associations found in
the D2D matrix construction. These associations are based on signals seen together
by a single degree of separation. That is, wi and dj are possibly associated if wi
was seen with dk , but other pseudonyms were also seen at the same time, where
dk is a DSRC pseudonym associated to dj . Like the previous level of boosting, I
also consider the number of times signals were seen together, giving those that were
seen together multiple times a larger boost than those that were seen fewer times
together. For a given pseudonym dj , I boost all identifiers in W , where W is the set
of all WiFi signifiers seen with a DSRC pseudonym dk , and take the boost from W 0 ,
where W 0 is the set of all WiFi signifiers not seen with dj or not seen with dk , where
dk is a DSRC pseudonym associated to dj . At this level, I use a different ∆ than
the previous level, called ∆’, which is the minimum between 1.5*∆ and 0.99. This
larger ∆ value is due to boosting’s effectiveness being based on Σ, which is the sum
of all elements corresponding to elements less likely to be associated. Because this is
the second level of boosting, the less likely associated corresponding elements have
already been decreased in the first level of boosting, resulting in a smaller Σ. So, for
the boosting to still be effective, I need to increase ∆ to increase the amount of value
that I “take” from Σ to be redistributed. Note that at this step, when evaluating the
relationship between wi and dj , I also look to see if dj is associated with any other
DSRC pseudonym dk that is known to be associated to wi (i.e. wi and dk were seen
together with no other pseudonyms around). If this is the case, I automatically set wi
and dj to be a known association, ignoring any other identifiers that dj was seen with
and not boosting any identifiers at this level with regards to pseudonym dj . I also
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disassociate wi from any pseudonym that is disassociated from dj and redistribute
the respective probability value among all elements in the corresponding column that
do not currently equal zero.
The final set of possible associations uses DSRC-to-DSRC possible associations
found in the D2D matrix construction. Using the same degree of separation logic as
before but using DSRC pseudonyms that are possibly associated, I consider a pair wi
and dj to be possibly associated if wi was seen with dk , where dk is a DSRC pseudonym
possibly associated to dj . At the previous level, for a given pseudonym dj , boosting
any WiFi identifiers possibly associated to dj is superseded by an automatic known
association between wi and dj if there existed a dk that was the only seen DSRC
pseudonym with wi at a single listener (i.e. wi is associated to dk and dk is associated
to dj , therefore wi is also associated to dj ). However, due to the low precision of
possible associations, applying the same transitive automatic associations logic as
the previous level would yield too many false positives. Therefore, because I still
want to give some credence to these conjectures, I treat a WiFi identifier that would
have been automatically associated as simply another identifier that was seen with a
pseudonym that is possibly associated to the given pseudonym, adding it to the set
of identifiers to be boosted. In addition to this, I also use a different ∆” than the
previous levels. ∆00 is equal to 0.75*∆ due to the low precision and thus confidence
of the D2D possible associations used to extend boosting at this level. Similar to the
previous levels of boosting, I again take into account the number of times a pair of
signals were seen together, giving a larger boost to those seen more times together
than those seen fewer times together. For a given pseudonym dj , I boost all identifiers
in W , where W is the set of all WiFi identifiers seen with dk , and take the boost from
W 0 , where W 0 is the set of all WiFi signifiers not seen with dj , or dk or dl , where dk
is a pseudonym associated to dj and dl is a pseudonym possibly associated to dj .
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When the WiFi-to-DSRC association matrix is fully constructed, I look for any
probabilities that meet a certain confidence threshold. Using a minimum confidence
threshold of 50%, because each column sums to one, a probability of at least 50%
means that the element’s corresponding WiFi-DSRC association contains the majority. The results for different levels of confidence thresholds is presented in Chapter 5.

3.4.3

WiFi Null Boosting

A problem arises when an attacker does not know how many vehicles in the area
of observation have WiFi capability, that is an attacker is unable to determine the
number of vehicles with WiFi capability and the number of vehicles without. One
approach that I have explored is a method I dubbed WiFi Null Boosting. WiFi
Null Boosting follows the same boosting principle as aforementioned, where for a
given DSRC pseudonym dj , I increase the value of all elements elementij where WiFi
identifier wi is an identifier more likely to be associated to dj than an identifier that is
not being boosted. In the case of WiFi Null Boosting, the WiFi identifier used is WiFi
Null. Therefore, each time a DSRC pseudonym dj is seen at a listener for an entire
period without any overlapping WiFi signals around, then the probability that dj is
associated to WiFi Null (i.e. dj originated from a vehicle without WiFi capability)
is boosted, where the boost is taken from all other probabilities in the given column.
WiFi Null Boosting uses its own redistribution factor (WiFi Null ∆) that is different
from the main delta value. Unfortunately, my experiments regarding this method
yielded little results. Due to the DSRC protocol’s high frequency heart rate and
WiFi protocol’s low frequency heart rate, many more pseudonyms were seen without
an overlapping WiFi than the number of pseudonyms actually originating from a
vehicle without WiFi. This, in combination with the relatively low change-rate of
the DSRC pseudonym in my simulation, made it extremely difficult to determine the
correct pseudonyms. Thus, boosting with a small redistribution factor yielded no
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positives (true or false), and boosting with a medium or large redistribution factor
yielded too many false positives, and ultimately detracted from the number of correct
WiFi-to-DSRC associations.
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Chapter 4
IMPLEMENTATION

In this chapter, I expand on the design overview detailed in Chapter 3 by providing
pseudocode for the algorithms used in the attack and explaining in more detail the
reasoning behind many of the implementation choices.

4.1

Terminology

I begin with definitions of commonly used terms in my attack. Listeners are the
devices used to pick up radio signals. I assume perfect packet reception, therefore if
a listener is within range of a vehicle when it emits a signal, then the listener picks
up the packet. Listeners record packets and their pseudonym or identifier in terms of
observation intervals. Observation intervals contain the listener it was recorded at, the
pseudonym or identifier the packet used, the protocol used, the time a pseudonym was
first seen at a given listener, and the last time it was seen. The observation interval’s
start and stop times are recored on the basis that the listener receives a continuous
stream of packets with a pseudonym or identifier over a given time. Since packets
are discrete, I allow for a gap between packets. This gap can be adjusted depending
on the protocols that are being used. Therefore, if a vehicle leaves a listener’s range,
then returns some times later still using the same pseudonym, the listener will create
two separate observation intervals for that vehicle.
We define overlapping as the following when used to describe listener coverage,
time intervals, and observation intervals. Overlapping listener coverage and overlapping time interval definitions are straightforward. Overlapping listener coverage is
when an area is in the range of multiple listeners, thus those listeners overlap their
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Figure 4.1: Example of Observation Intervals Having Overlapping Time
Intervals
coverage. Overlapping time intervals is when the time intervals of multiple observation intervals overlap in time. An example of overlapping time intervals is illustrated
in Figure 4.1, where observation intervals A and B have overlapping time intervals
because B ’s start time t1B is less than A’s end time t2A , meaning B began before A
ended. Overlapping observation inteverals is when observation intervals both overlap
in time and are recorded at the same listener. Therefore, for a given observation interval, any other observation interval is said to be overlapping if they have overlapping
time intervals that occurred at the same listener.
The observation area is the combined coverage area of all listeners. For my work,
I consider mix zones as areas outside of the area of observation, where vehicles can
mix and change pseudonyms without the attacker’s knowledge.
Enter and exit events are used in the Exit-to-Enter Attack as part of the D2D
matrix construction. These terms were previously defined in [6] and [3] as when
vehicles enters or exit a mix zone, respectively. However, in this paper I define enter
and exit events in terms of the area of observations, that is, enter and exit events
are when a vehicle enters or exits the area of observation, respectively. Therefore, an
enter event is when a vehicle exits the mix zone and enters the area of observation.
An exit event is the opposite, when a vehicle enters the mix zone and exits the area
of observation. An illustration of enter and exit events can be found in Figure 3.2. As
per the illustration, the moment a vehicle comes within range of a listener is the enter
event, and when it leaves the range of a listener is the exit event. Therefore, an enter
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event can be recorded as the start of an observation interval, and an exit event as the
end of an observation interval. Note that in the illustration I mark the locations of
the enter and exit events. Due to my assumption that attackers are not able to read
the location data associated with a pseudonym, I cannot actually pinpoint the exact
locations of exit and enter events, simply record the listener’s location at which the
events occurred.
I define association as originating vehicle. Therefore, a pseudonym is associated to
another pseudonym or an identifier if the two signals originate from the same vehicle.
I refer to my two matrices as association matrices. An association matrix is a
matrix where elementij is a value representing the association status between its corresponding row and column values. The D2D association matrix contains values that
represent the type of association between two pseudonyms (e.g. -1 = no information,
1 = association). The W2D association matrix contains values that represent the
probability of an identifier and pseudonym being associated.
I define boosting as the act of taking a percentage of elements in the W2D association matrix and redistributing the taken amount to other elements. Boosting is
done in terms of DSRC pseudonyms in the W2D matrix construction, that is boosting
happens independently in each column. When I conclude that WiFi identifier in set
W are more likely to be associated to a given DSRC pseudonym dj than WiFi identifiers in a separate set of WiFi identifiers W’, then I say that for dj , I am boosting the
identifiers in W and taking the boost from identifiers in W’. I boost the identifiers
in W by increasing the value of elements in column j that correspond to those identifiers, and I take the boost from identifiers in W’ by decreasing the same amount
as the total amount given to the boosted identifiers. The redistribution of values by
increasing the probability that pseudonym dj is associated to an identifier in W and
decreasing the probability that it is associated to an identifier in set W’ is to reflect
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in the matrix the conclusion that some identifiers are more likely to be associated to
dj and others are less likely. Note that the set W’ is not necessarily simply Wall − W ,
where Wall is the set of all WiFi identifiers seen across all listeners. An example of
boosting is shown in Figure 4.2. In this example, d1 is more likely to be associated to
w1 , w2 , and w3 and less likely to be associated to w4 , and w5 . Therefore, I will boost
the former set and take the boost from latter set. Σ is defined to be the summation
of elements corresponding to identifiers in W’. ∆ is the redistribution factor, that is
the percentage taken from Σ to be redistributed to the boosted values. The redistribution is not necessarily equal. As seen in Figure 4.2, the portion given to each
boosted value is multiplied by a respective c value and divided by the summation of
all c values. The variable c allows us to boost some identifiers in W more than others,
based on how often each identifier meets the boosting criteria. For example, if I am
boosting identifiers that are seen with pseudonym dj , then an identifier’s c value is
the number of times the identifier was seen with dj . Thereby, identifiers seen more
times with dj will have a larger c value, and get a larger boost than those seen less
often and with a smaller c value.
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Figure 4.2: Example of Boosting

4.2

Attack Model Breakdown

I design the attack model by constructing two association matrices: DSRC-to-DSRC
(D2D) and WiFi-to-DSRC (W2D). I process the information that listeners have gathered to create two hash maps dgroups and wgroups. I use dgroups to map each DSRC
pseudonym to a list of its corresponding observation intervals, and wgroups to map
each WiFi identifier to a list of its corresponding obersvation intervals. These maps
are used when constructing the two matrices.
The following sections detail the construction process of both the D2D association
matrix and the W2D association matrix.
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4.3

DSRC-to-DSRC

The D2D matrix is an M xM matrix where M is the number of unique DSRC
pseudonyms observed across all listeners. Within the matrix, elementij corresponds
to the association status between pseudonyms di and dj . In my model, this status
is represented by four possible values: -1 (no information), 0 (disassociated), 1 (associated), or 0.5 (possibly associated). Note that 0.5 is simply a constant value that
we have chosen to signify possible associaiton. Future techniques may distinguish
different possible associations by their confidence, and have possible associations be
represented by a number between 0 to 1 (exclusive). But as I currently have only a
single form of making possible DSRC-to-DSRC association, I simply chose 0.5, which
is halfway between 0 and 1. At the start, all elements are initialized to -1, except for
the diagonal which is initialized to 1 (i.e., a pseudonym is associated to itself). After
the initialization, the matrix construction is broken into a series of steps; theses steps
are finding disassociations, the Same Listener Attack, the X2E Attack, and applying
the transitive property across the matrix. I explain each of these steps in more detail
in the following subsections, with pseudocode for the entire D2D matrix construction
algorithm in Algorithm 5. After construction, it is used in a transitive manner when
making W2D disassociations and boosting. For example, if DSRC pseudonyms d1
and d2 are disassociated and w1 is found to be associated to d1 , then w1 cannot be associated to d2 (disassociated). I present the results of my experiments using different
components of the D2D matrix construction in Chapter 5.

4.3.1

Disassociations

I begin by finding disassociations. I conclude that two pseudonyms di and dj are
disassociated if they have overlapping time intervals at different listeners. This implies that they were at two different locations during the overlapping time because I
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assume non-overlapping listener coverage. If they are at the same listener, then they
are either considered associated or possibly associated, which I explain in the following subsections. To find disassociations, I iterate through the set of pseudonyms,
comparing each pseudonym di ’s observation intervals with every other pseudonym
dj ’s oberservation intervals, looking for the criteria for disassociation. Note that we
assume unique pseudonyms across all vehicles.
Input: dgroups: Dictionary mapping DSRC pseudonym to list of
observation intervals
Result: Updates D2D matrix with associations found
dobis ← set of all observation intervals
dobis.sort() group by pseudonyms, then order by ascending time order
foreach DSRC psuedonym di ∈ dobis do
start ← first time and location di is seen
end ← last time and location di is seen
record start and end for di
end
foreach DSRC psuedonym di ∈ dobis do
foreach DSRC pseudonym dj ∈ dobis that is not equal to di do
if di .location = dj .location and dj .start is DSRC-HEARTRATE
seconds after di .end then
mtx[i, j] ← mtx[j, i] ← 1
end
end
Algorithm 1: Same Listener Attack finds associated DSRC pairs based on
a DSRC appearing immediately after another DSRC is last seen
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4.3.2

Same Listener Attack

In the Same Listener Attack, I create associations between pseudonyms using the
algorithm found in Algorithm 1. The Same Listener Attack leverages knowledge of
the protocol heart rates and is based on the idea that if a vehicle were within range
of a listener, then when the vehicle uses the new pseudonym for the first time, to the
listener it will appear as if a new vehicle entered its are of observation. Therefore, I
look for pseudonyms that first appear at listeners where pseudonyms were last seen.
I start by taking the set of all observation intervals, grouping them by pseudonyms,
then sorting them by ascending time order. I then record when and where the first and
last time each pseudonym is seen. I then iterate through all pseudonyms, checking to
see if any of them are first seen DSRC heart rate seconds after any other pseudonym
is last seen. Any pair of pseudonyms that meet these criteria are labeled as associated
in the D2D matrix.

4.3.3

X2E Attack

The next attack is dubbed the X2E (Exit-to-Enter ) Attack. This algorithm is based
on the attacks used in [6] and [3], where an attack tries to match exit events to their
corresponding enter events. This is done by creating a weighted bipartite graph for
the set of exit events and the set of enter events and solving the linear sum problem to
get a minimal sum cost perfect match of the graph. The attack is broken up into two
phases: a learning phase and an attack phase. I add improvements to both phases,
which I explain in each of their respective subsections.
The following subsections detail the learning phase and attack phase of the X2E
Attack.
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Input: dgroups: Dictionary mapping DSRC pseudonym to list of
observation intervals
Output: Mapping of pair of listeners (A,B) to number of vehicles traveling
from A to B and combined time it took
Extract subject id’s from observations intervals in dgroups and consolidate
by subject id sgroups ← mapping subject id to list of respective
observation intervals data ← empty hash map
foreach subject id si , list of observation intervals obis ∈ sgroups do
obis.sort() sort by ascending time order
foreach pair of observation intervals (o1 , o2 ) ∈ obis do
if o1 .start < o2 .start then
key ← (o1 .loc, o2 .loc)
data[key] add 1 to count of number of vehicles, add (o2 .start o1 .end) to total time
end
end
return data
Algorithm 2: Learning Phase Gathers data needed to create weighted edges
in Attack Phase of X2E Attack
Learning Phase

During the learning phase, I record the number of vehicles that traveled between
two listener locations and their total travel time. I use this information to assign
weights to the edges between exit and enter events. I illustrate my algorithm in
Algorithm 4. Previous implementations of the learning phase realisticly limit their
knowledge by treating each pseudonym as a separate vehicle. This leads to data
skewed towards a greater number of recorded vehicles than there actually are [6]. For
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my implementation. Because it is a simulation, I do a lookup of the pseudonyms to
their corresponding vehicles, eliminating the problem of double-counting pseudonyms
from the same vehicle towards the total vehicle count. I chose this to illustrate the best
case scenario, and I argue that an attacker can simulate traffic on their target area
to get data comparable to ours. Previous attacks have also used this in an online
(real-time) attack, where data collected during the learning phase is not attacked,
but simply used to created the bipartite graph. Because my attack model is targeted
towards a passive attacker, I use my entire attacked simulation for the learning phase.
I then try to attack the same simulation during the attack phase. I chose this, again,
to illustrate the best case scenario for an attacker.
The learning algorithm begins by consolidating all observation intervals belonging
to pseudonyms from the same originating vehicle. For each subject vehicle, I sort its
observation intervals by ascending time order to recreate a vehicle’s path. I create
a hash map mapping a pair of listeners (A, B) to a tuple containing the number of
vehicles that went from A to B and the total time all vehicles took. I do this by going
through every permutation of size two (o1 , o2 ) of every vehicle’s list of observation
intervals. If o1 occurs before o2 , then I use their locations as the key into the map,
increase the count of number of vehicles by one, and add the difference between o2 ’s
start time and o1 ’s end time (i.e., the travel time of the vehicle leaving o1 ’s location
and arriving at o2 ’s location). I then return the hash map to calculate weights between
exit and enter events during the attack phase.

Weights

Weights are assigned to an edge between each exit event and each enter event within
the bipartite graph of the X2E Attack. The weight of an edge connecting an exit
event x and an enter event e represents the likelihood that the vehicle leaving x re-
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entered the observation area at e. In the example illustration in Figure 3.2, enter2
is the corresponding enter event to exit1 . My goal is to give the edge connecting
exit1 to enter2 an appropriate weight such that it will be chosen when solving the
linear sum problem on the bipartite graph. Note that I use negative weights to
signify greater likelihood due to Python’s NumPy package having a builtin linear
sum problem solution, and not a maximal sum cost solution. The weight algorithm
I use is based on the research of [6] and [3], but I improve it by using previously
found associations and taking into account the actual travel time between events to
get more accurate results. My improvements increased the association recall, while
maintaining the same precision.
The weight of an edge between exit event x and enter event e are determined
by a set of criteria, for which the pseudocode can be found in Algorithm 3. If e
occurred before x, then I choose a weight such that the edge will not be chosen
(i.e., M AX N U M , where M AX N U M is an extremely large number). If x and e
have the same pseudonyms, then choose a weight such that the edge will be chosen
(i.e., M IN N U M ). If the pseudonyms corresponding to x and e have already been
found to be associated, then I choose a weight such that the edge will be chosen (i.e.,
M IN N U M , where M IN N U M is an extremely large negative value); and vice
versa, where if the pseudonyms have already been found to be disassociated, then I
choose a weight such that the edge will not be chosen (i.e., M AX N U M ). If during
the learning phase I saw no vehicles travel from x’s location to e’s location, then I
give it a relatively small weight such that the edge may still be chosen, but unlikely
(i.e., −0.1). If none of the previous conditions were met, then I give the edge a weight
using the learned data. Given that n0 is the number of vehicles that went from x’s
took to travel
location to e’s location, and t0 is the average time they took ( total time vehicles
n0

), and tdelta is the actual travel time (e’s timestamp substract x’s timestamp), I first
calculate terror as either 2−

t delta
t0

if tdelta is less than t0 , or as
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t delta
t0

if t is greater

Input: x: exit event, e: enter event, learn: map representing learned data
from Learning Phase(), mtx: current D2D matrix
Output: weight inversely relational to likelihood exit and enter events are
associated (smaller number → more likely)
if e occurredbefore x then then
w ← M AX N U M
else if x and e have the same pseudonym then
w ← M IN N U M
else if x.pseudonym and e.pseudonym have already been found to be
disassociated then
w ← M AX N U M
else if x.pseudonym and e.pseudonym have already been found to be
associated then
w ← M IN N U M
else if learn saw no vehicles going from x.location to e.location then
w ← −0.1
else
n0 ← number of vehicles that went from x.location to e.location
t0 ← (total time vehicles took to travel ) / n0
tdelta ← e.time − x.time
if tdelta < t0 then
terror ← 2 - tdelta / t0
else
terror ← tdelta / t0
n0
t
w←− 0
terror
return w
Algorithm 3: weight Returns the weight of an edge connecting an exit event
to an enter event representing likelihood (smaller number → more likely)
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than or equal to t0 . The variable terror represents the error rate that the actual
travel time is from the average travel time, penalizing a pair the further away the
actual travel time is from the average. The two separate calculations for terror ensure
equal penalization whether the error is above or below the average. Once I have that
calculated, the weight returned is:
−

n0
t0
terror

This equation correlates the likelihood of an exit and enter event being linked
together to the number of vehicles that previously traveled between the events’ locations and the time they took. Thereby, the more vehicles that traveled from x’s
location to e’s location, the more likely they are linked. The rational for this is that
higher vehicle counts indicate a main road as opposed to a smaller streets, and if
historically many vehicles traveled from x’s location to e’s location, then it is highly
likely that a vehicle leaving x’s location also traveled to e’s location. Also, the shorter
the average time taken to travel from x’s location to e’s location, the more likely they
are linked. The rational behind this is that a longer travel time equates to more time
spent in the mix zone, areas outside of the area of observation. This time can be
spent changing pseudonyms without the attacker’s knowledge. A longer travel time
also decreases the magnitude of the weight returned because vehicles normally take
the shortest route possible to get from point A to point B. If there are two enter
events e1 and e2 that are both possibly matched to exit event x1 , and the travel time
from x1 to e1 is less than the time from x1 to e2 , then I know that it is possible to
get between the two locations in the shorter travel time. Therefore, the shorter travel
time is the more likely corresponding enter event and the longer travel time is less
likely.
Previous implementations of this weight function use the difference between tdelta
and t0 combined with a multiplier as a the numerator:
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n0
.
|tdelta −t0 |+0.000001

This equation

makes the actual value of the average travel time less signficant, and makes its value
relative to the actual travel time. I found that my equation, which gives more credence
to the average travel time, while maintaining the penalty of a large difference between
the actual and average travel times, gave us better results both in finding DSRC-toDSRC associations, and in turn WiFi-to-DSRC associations.

Attack Phase

Now that I have explained the weight algorithm, I will explain the attack portion of
the attack. This attack was previously used in an online attack [6], but I adapt it to
my passive attack by recreating the exit and enter events as they happen by stepping
through a sorted list of observation of intervals. First, I sort the set of all observation
intervals by ascending time order to recreate the recording of events in the order they
actually happened. For each observation interval obi, I record obi’s start time and
location as enter event e and put it into the set of all enter events. I then search
within the set of all currently recorded exit events for an exit event with a matching
pseudonym to e. If there exists one, then I match them and remove both from their
respective sets. I then record the obi’s end time and location as the exit event and
put it into the set of all exit events.
I then create a matrix to represent the bipartite graph. Elementij represents the
weight of the edge between exit event xi and enter event ej . I initialize all values to
0. Then I calculate the weight value for every pair of enter and exit events, recording
the greatest magnitude weight, excluding magnitudes of MAX NUM (an extremely
large number) which are equivalent to known associations. The maximum weight
is used for differentiating between associations and possible associaitons later on. I
then obtain a minimum sum graph by using NumPy to solve the linear sum problem
on the bipartite graph. Iterating through each edge of the solved graph, I extract
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Input: dgroups: Dictionary mapping DSRC pseudonym to list of
observation intervals, mtx: D2D matrix, mw perc: percentage of
maximum weight
Result: Updates D2D matrix with associations found
learn ← Learning Phase()
enter events ← ∅
exit events ← ∅
Sort observation intervals by ascending time order
foreach observation interval obi do
Record enter event e using (obi.start, obi.pseudonym, obi.location)
if ∃ exit event x ∈ exit events with the same pseudonym as e then
Remove each from their respective set
Record exit event x using (obi.end, obi.pseudonym, obi.location)
end
x2e ← (Number of exit events) x (Number of enter events) matrix and
initialize all entries to 0
foreach exit event xi do
foreach enter event ej do
x2e[i, j] ← weight(xi , ej , learn)
Keep track of greatest magnitude weight (excluding MAX NUM i.e.,
known associations)
end
end
Solve minimum sum graph for x2e
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foreach edge ej in solved graph do
if | ej’s weight| is mw perc of the max weight observed then
Set ej’s events’ pseudonyms to associated in mtx;
else
Set ej’s events’ pseudonyms to possibly associated in mtx;
end
Algorithm 4: X2E Attack Matches exit events to enter events to associate
pseudonyms
the pseudonyms from each edge’s exit and enter events. If the weight of the edge
is above some percentage of the maximum weight, then I set the two pseudonyms
to be associated. If not, then I set them to be possibly associated due to the low
precision of attack method. By differentiating between the greater weighted edges
(i.e., the more likely to be correct) and the lower weighted edges (i.e., the less likely
correct), I am able to improve my results while still giving some credence to the
lower weighted edges. For my experiments, I use a percentage of 50%. Therefore,
edges that have a weight greater than 50% of the maximum recorded weight are
considered to be associations, otherwise the edges are labeled as possibly associated.
I then create a matrix to represent the bipartite graph. Elementij represents the
weight of the edge between exit event xi and enter event ej . I initialize all values
to 0. Then I calculate the weight value for every pair of enter and exit events,
recording the greatest magnitude weight, excluding magnitudes of MAX NUM which
are equivalent to known associations. The maximum weight is used for differentiating
between associations and possible associaitons later on. An example of a completed
weighted bipartite graph is shown in Figure 3.3.
I then obtain a minimum sum graph by using NumPy to solve the linear sum
problem on the bipartite graph. Iterating through each edge of the solved graph, I
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extract the pseudonyms from each edge’s exit and enter events. If the weight of the
edge is above some percentage of the maximum weight, then I set the two pseudonyms
to be associated. If not, then I set them to be possibly associated due to the low
precision of the attack method. By differentiating between the greater weighted edges
(i.e., the more likely to be correct) and the lower weighted edges (i.e., the less likely
correct), I am able to improve my results while still giving some credence to the lower
weighted edges. For my experiments, I use a percentage of 50%. Therefore, edges
that have a weight greater than 50% of the maximum recorded weight are considered
to be associations, otherwise the edges are labeled as possibly associated.

4.3.4

Transitive Property

At the end of the D2D matrix construction, I apply the transitive property across the
matrix first for associations, then disassociations. For example, if DSRC pseudonym
d1 and d2 are associated, and d2 and d3 are associated, then by the transitive property they are all associated to each other. I do not apply the transitive property for
possible associations due to the low confidence of possible associations. Applying the
transitive property for D2D possible associations caused a cascading number of incorrect associations when an incorrect possible association bridged different associated
groups (groups where all member within a group is associated to each other). Because
disassociations are applied after associations, disassociations will take precedence over
an association if there is conflicting data.

4.4

WiFi-to-DSRC

After construction of the D2D matrix, it is used in the construction of the W2D matrix. The W2D matrix construction begins by constructing an N+1 xM matrix where
N and M are the number of unique WiFi identifiers and unique DSRC pseudonyms
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Input: dgroups: Dictionary mapping DSRC pseudonym to list of
observation intervals
Output: MxM matrix representing DSRC-to-DSRC association information,
where M = number of DSRC pseudonyms seen
mtx ← M xM matrix
initialize all values to -1, and diagonal to 1
foreach DSRC di do
foreach DSRC dj where there is no information for mtx[i,j] do
Compare all of di ’s observation intervals to all of dj ’s observation
intervals
if any overlap in time and are at different listeners then
set di and dj as disassociated
end
Same Listener Attack()
X2E Attack()
Apply transitive property to mtx for associations and disassociations
(NOT possible associations)
return mtx
end
Algorithm 5: build d2d mtx Constructs association matrix of DSRC-to-DSRC
associations, -1:no information, 0:disassociation, 1:association, (0,1):possible association
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observered across all listeners, respectively. An extra row is added to represent all
vehicles in the area of observation that do not have WiFi capbailities, if any exist. Elements in the matrix range in values between 0 and 1 (inclusive) and are representative
of the probability that their corresponding WiFi identifier and DSRC pseudonym are
associated. Each element is initialized to be

1
,
N +1

that is each pseudonym is equally

likely to be associated to any identifier. Because an identifier can be associated with
many pseudonyms, but a pseudonym can only be associated to a single identifier,
each column must sum to 1, while each row can sum to any arbitrary value. After
intialization, the matrix construction consists of finding disassociations, known associations, and then possible associations. Possible associations are handled through
the use of boosting. There are three separate phases or levels of boosting, with each
subsequent level holding less authority than the previous. Therefore, the more likely
possible associations are boosted in the first level of boosting, those less likely in the
second, and those least likely in the final. Each step of the W2D matrix construction
will be explained in the following subsections.

4.4.1

Disassociations

I begin by finding disassociations between identifiers and pseudonyms using Algorithm 6. I do this in a similar manner as when finding DSRC-to-DSRC disassociations, where an identifier and pseudonym are found to be disassociated if they have
overlapping time intervals recorded at different listeners, assuming non-overlapping
listener coverage. Any identifier-pseudonym pair (wi , dj ) found to disassociated will
have its corresponding element elementij set to 0, indicating that the two elements
cannot be associated. Elementij ’s original value is then evenly distributed among all
elements in column j that do not currently equal 0. This is indicative of dj being
found to not be a possible association to wi . Thus, dj is more likely to be associated
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to any other WiFi identifier that it has not yet been been found to be disassociated
from.
Disassociations found from overlapping time intervals at different listeners are
extended by using known DSRC-to-DSRC associations from the D2D matrix. For a
given WiFi identifier wi and its set of disassociated DSRC pseudonyms not assoc, I
also conclude that wi is disassociated from dk , where dk is associated to at least one
pseudonym in not assoc. For example, if w1 and d1 are found to be disassociated, but
d1 and d2 were previously found to be associated during the D2D matrix construction,
then w1 and d2 are also concluded to be disassociated.
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Input: mtx: Current W2D matrix, wgroups: Dictionary mapping WiFi
identifier to list of observation intervals, ∆: Redistribution factor value between (0,1)
Output: W2D matrix with found disassociations applied
foreach WiFi wi ∈ wgroups do
foreach DSRC dj where there is no information for mtx[i,j] do
if wi and dj have observation intervals oi and oj overlapping in time
then
if oi and oj are at different listeners then
Add dj to wi ’s list of disassociated
Remove dj from all of wi ’s list of possible associations by
location if present
else
if dj wasn’t previously found to be disassociated from wi then
Add dj to wi ’s list of possible associations based on location
end
end
foreach WiFi wi and its list of disassociated not assoc do
not assoc ← Union not assoc with set of all DSRCs that are associated to
at least one of the DSRCs in not assoc
foreach DSRC dj in not assoc do
Set wi and dj to be disassociated in mtx
Distribute the original value in mtx equally among all other rows in
column i that don’t currently have a value 0
end
end
Algorithm 6: w2d disassociations Finds and applies W2D disassociations
into the W2D matrix
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4.4.2

Known Associations

I then find known associations between identifiers and pseudonyms. Known associations are associations with such high confidence that the attack model automatically
concludes that they are actual associations. An identifier and pseudonym pair are
found to be known associated if they have overlapping observation intervals and no
other signals are seen at the same time, that is, during the time the identfier’s observation interval and pseudonym’s observation interval overlap, there are no other
overlapping observation intervals. An example of this is shown in Figure 1.4, where
w1 and d1 are both seen at a listener at a some point in time with no other signals
around. Any known associated identifier-pseudonym pair (wi , dj ) will have its corresponding element elementij set to 1 and all other elements in column j are set to 0
to maintain the summation of 1. Algorithm 7 contains the algorithm for both finding
known associations and applying Level 1 boosting due to their similar criteria.
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Input: mtx: Current W2D matrix, wgroups: Dictionary mapping WiFi
identifier to list of observation intervals, ∆: Redistribution factor value between (0,1)
Output: W2D matrix with found associations and Level 1 possible
associations applied
d2w ← emptyhashmap;
foreach WiFi wi and its list of lists of possibly associated DSRCs by location
assocs by loc do
foreach list of possibly associated DSRCS assocs ∈ assoc by loc do
if only 1 DSRC dj ∈ assocs then
Record that dj was seen with wi + 1 using d2w;
mtx[i, j] ← 1;
mtx[i0 , j] ← 0, where i0 corresponds to each WiFi identifiers
excluding wi ;
mtx[i, j 0 ] ← 0;
where j 0 corresponds to all DSRC pseudonyms disassociated to dj ;
Redistribute each mtx[i,j’] value evenly among all other rows in
column j 0 that don’t equal 0;
end
else
foreach DSRC dj in assocs do
Record in d2w that dj was seen with wi + 1;
end
end
end
end
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foreach DSRC dj in d2w do
not rs ← all WiFi identifiers not seen with dj ;
Σ ← sum of probabilites of identifiers in not rs;
total ← total number of times dj was seen with any WiFi;
foreach WiFi wi in d2w[dj ] do
mult ← number of times dj was seen with wi ;
mtx[i,j] +=

∆∗Σ
total

* mult;

end
end
Algorithm 7: w2d known associations and level1 boosting Finds and
applies W2D associations and Level 1 possible associations into the W2D matrix

4.4.3

Possible Associations

I then find possible associations between identifiers and pseudonyms. An identifier
and pseudonym pair are found to be possibly associated if they have overlapping
observation intervals, but there are also other overlapping intervals around belonging
to other pseudonyms. An example of this is shown in Figure 1.5, where WiFi identifier
w1 is seen with both DSRC pseudonyms d1 and d2 . Because w1 is seen with both d1
and d2 at the same listener at the same point in time, then I say that w1 is possibly
associated to both d1 and d2 . Possible associations are incorporated into the matrix
through the use of boosting, and because boosting is done independently in each
column (i.e., boosting is done in terms of DSRC pseudonyms), I need to invert the
mapping of WiFi identifiers to their list of possibly associated DSRC pseudonyms
into DSRC pseudonyms to their list of possibly associated WiFi identifiers. I do this
by iterating through each WiFi identifier wi ’s list of DSRC pseudonyms poss assocs.
For each DSRC pseudonym dj in poss assocs, I record that wi was seen with dj ,
keeping a count of the number of times each pair is seen together. This mapping is
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used during boosting to figure out which WiFi identifiers are being boosted for each
DSRC pseudonym.
There are three levels of possible associations, each corresponding to a level of
boosting. Because the boosted amount is based on the summation of those less likely
to be associated to a given pseudonym, each subsequent level of boosting is less
magntudinous than preceding levels. I also use different ∆s (redistribution factors)
at each level of boosting. While these ∆ values can be tuned using machine learning
techniques to get the optimal values, I choose my values based on experimentation. I
explain my reasoning for my chosen values in the following subsections, and present
the effects of changing the ∆ values has on my attack results in Chapter 5. Level 1
boosting handles immediate possible associations, where for a given pseudonym dj , I
boost identifiers seen directly with dj . Level 2 boosting handles possible associations
of a single degree of separation, where for a given pseudonym dj , I boost identifiers
seen with a pseudonym that is associated to dj . And Level 3 boosting handles possible
associations with a single “weak” degree of separation, where for a given pseudonym
dj , I boost identifiers seen with a pseudonym that is possibly associated to dj .

Level 1 Boosting

The first level of boosting handles the immediate possible associations. That is, a
DSRC pseudonym dj and WiFi identifier wi are said to be possibly associated if
wi and dj have a pair of overlapping oberservation intervals, but there were other
pseudonyms around at the time. For each DSRC pseudonym dj and its set of WiFi
identifiers it was seen with seen with, I calculate Σ (the total probability of the lesser
likely to be associated identifiers) using the set of identifiers:
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{w | w is an identifier less likely to be associated to dj } =
{w | w is an identifier seen by a listener}
− {w | w is an identifier overlapping with dj with other pseudonyms around}
(4.1)
At Level 1, I use a ∆ of 0.6. From my experiments, I saw that 0.6 gave us a
relatively high number of true positives, without dramatically increasing the number
of false positives. I show the effects of changing the ∆ value on my attack results in
Chapter Chapter 5. For each of the less likely associated identifiers, I multiply their
corresponding elements by (1 − ∆); making the amount to be redistributed among
the possible associations to be Σ ∗ ∆. To begin redistribution for a given DSRC
pseudonym dj , I sum up the total number of times it was seen with any identifier
(total seen with), then for each identifier wi to be boosted, I boost wi by
Σ∗∆
∗ multi
total seen with
where multj is the number of times wi was seen with dj . This allows us to favor
WiFi-DSRC pairs that are seen more often together by giving them a larger boost.
For example, if identifier w1 and pseudonym d1 are seen together twice and w2 and
d1 are seen together only once, then the d1 should be more likely to be associated to
w1 than w2 .

Level 2 Boosting

The second level of boosting handles possible associations by a degree of separation
based on known DSRC-to-DSRC associations. That is, a DSRC pseudonym dj and
WiFi identifier wi are said to be possibly associated if wi and dk have a pair of
overlapping oberservation intervals, but there were other pseudonyms around at the
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time, where dk is any pseudonym associated to dj . For Level 2 boosting, the set of
identifiers that I take the boost from is:

{w | w is an identifier less likely to be associated to dj } =
{w | w is an identifier seen by a listener}
− {w | w is an identifier overlapping with dj with other pseudonyms around}
− {w | w is an identifier overlapping with a pseudonym associated to dj with others around}
(4.2)
Note that for a given pseudonym dj , I remove both identifiers seen with a pseudonym
associated to dj and identifiers seen with dj from the set of identifiers that I take the
boost from. This is to prevent penalizing any identifiers that were boosted in Level
1.
At Level 2, I use the same boosting method as Level 1, but a different ∆ value, ∆0 ,
that is 1.5x the original ∆ value, with a max of 0.99. In my experiments, I use a value
of 0.9 (= 0.6·1.5). I choose a higher ∆0 than ∆ because the possible associations being
boosted at Level 2 are near the same precision as Level 1 possible associations. They
are of a near precision due to being only a single degree of separation and the high
precision of my DSRC-to-DSRC associations. Remember that the boosted amount
is determined by both the redistribution factor ∆0 and Σ, and Σ decreases each
subsequent boosting level due to both the set of identifiers that I take the boost from
growing smaller and their corresponding matrix element probability values decreasing
if previous levels of boosting occurred. Therefore, due to a potentially smaller Σ
value, to maintain a near equal boosting effect at Level 2 as Level 1, I increase the
redistribution factor. For example, let’s say w1 is boosted in Level 1 and w2 is boosted
in Level 2 for a given pseudonym. If Σ = 0.9 during Level 1 boosting and ∆ = 0.6,
then w1 gets a boost of 0.54 (0.6 · 0.9), and afterwards each element that constituted
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the Σ calculation is reduced by the ∆ in terms of percentage. Therefore, during Level
2 boosting, now Σ = 0.36 (= 0.9 · (1 − 0.6)). Using the redistribution factor ∆0 = 0.9,
w2 gets a boost of 0.324 (= 0.9 · 0.36). While not the exact same boost, the Level
2 boost was similar to the Level 1 boost, with the difference being argued that the
precision of the D2D associations is not 100%. Therefore, Level 2 boosting has a
proximate level of confidence as Level 1, but not the same. If a lower ∆0 value had
been chosen, then the boosted amount would have been even smaller, which can be
useful if new methods are integrated into the D2D matrix construction that increase
recall, but lower precision.
Aside from boosting possible associations, I also make known associations in this
phase, with associations having higher precedence than boosting. If a pseudonym is
found to have a known association with an identifier, then the association is automatically recorded in the W2D matrix and none of its possible associations at this
level are boosted. I apply the same logic of a single degree of separation when looking
for associations at this step. An identifier-pseudonym pair wi and dk are found to
be associated if wi and dk have overlapping intervals and no other pseudonyms were
around at the time, where dk is any pseudonym associated to dj . In other words, if an
identifier wi was found to be associated to dk , then any pseudonym associated to dj
is also associated to wi . Known associations can be made using the single degree of
separation due to the high precision of the D2D association matrix. If the D2D precision were to substantially drop, then these known associations using a single degree
of separation would not be as effective and often create incorrect known associations.
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Input: mtx: Current W2D matrix, wgroups: Dictionary mapping WiFi
identifier to list of observation intervals, ∆: Redistribution factor value between (0,1)
Output: W2D matrix with found Level 2 possible associations applied
d2w t ← emptyhashmap;
foreach DSRC dj do
foreach DSRC dk that is associated to dj excluding dk = dj do
if dj was ever only seen with 1 WiFi (i.e., automatic association then
mtx[i, k] ← 1;
mtx[i0 , k] ← 0, where i0 corresponds to each WiFi identifiers
excluding wi ;
mtx[i, k 0 ] ← 0;
where k 0 corresponds to all DSRC pseudonyms disassociated to dj ;
Redistribute each mtx[i,k’] value evenly among all other rows in
the k 0 column that don’t equal 0;
Remove dj from d2w t and break;
else
Record in d2w t that dj is possibly associated with each WiFi
identifiers wi seen with dk for the number of times dk and wi were
seen together;
end
end
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∆0 ← min(1.5 ∗ ∆, .99);
foreach DSRC dj in d2w t do
not rs ← [all WiFi identifiers] ∩ [WiFi identifiers seen with dj ] ∩ [WiFi
identifiers seen with a DSRC associated to dj ];
Σ ← sum of probabilites of identifiers in not rs;
total ← total number of times a DSRC associated to dj was seen with any
WiFi;
foreach WiFi wi in d2w t [dj ] do
mult ← number of times a DSRC associated to dj was seen with wi ;
mtx[i,j] +=

Σ∗∆0
total

* mult;

end
end
Algorithm 8: w2d level2 boosting Finds and applies W2D Level 2 possible
associations into the W2D matrix
Level 3 Boosting

The third and final level of boosting handles possible associations by a degree of separation based on possible DSRC-to-DSRC associations. That is, a DSRC pseudonym
dj and WiFi identifier wi are said to be possibly associated if wi and dk have a pair of
overlapping oberservation intervals, but there were other pseudonyms around at the
time, where dk is any pseudonym possibly associated to dj . For Level 3 boosting, the
set of identifiers that I take the boost from is:

64

{w | w is an identifier less likely to be associated to dj } =
{w | w is an identifier seen by a listener}
− {w | w is an identifier overlapping with dj with other pseudonyms around}
− {w | w is an identifier overlapping with a pseudonym associated to dj with others around}
− {w | w is an identifier overlapping with a pseudonym possibly associated to dj with
others around}
(4.3)
At Level 3, I use the same boosting method as previous levels, but again a different
∆ value, ∆00 , that is .75x the original ∆ value. In my experimenets, I use a value of
0.45 (= 0.6 · 0.75). I choose a lower ∆00 value than ∆ due to the high uncertainty
of DSRC-to-DSRC possible associations. I saw from my experiments that if I used
too high of a ∆00 value, then that created too many false positives, with very few
true positives. Remember that these possible associations are found from exit-enter
event pairs from the X2E Attack with a weighted edge that did not meet a weight
value threshold. While these possible associations have a high undercertainty, I still
wanted to give them some credence, so I use a low value redistribution factor in my
Level 3 boosting. I also do not extend the automatic known associations used in the
previous phase to this phase. Similarly to the low value ∆00 , I do not extend known
associations in this phase due to the high uncertainty of these possible associations,
where if I did extend known associations, then the number of false positives made
would greatly outnumber any true positives made.
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Input: mtx: Current W2D matrix, wgroups: Dictionary mapping WiFi
identifier to list of observation intervals, ∆: Redistribution factor value between (0,1)
Output: W2D matrix with found Level 3 possible associations applied
d2w mb getsemptyhashmap;
foreach DSRC dj do
foreach DSRC dk that is possibly associated to dj excluding dk = dj do
Record in d2w mb that dj is possibly associated with each WiFi
identifiers wi seen with dk for the number of times dk and wi were
seen together;
end
end
∆00 ← .75 ∗ ∆;
foreach DSRC dj in d2w t do
not rs ← [all WiFi identifiers] ∩ [WiFi identifiers seen with dj ] ∩ [WiFi
identifiers seen with a DSRC associated to dj ] ∩ [WiFi identifiers seen
with a DSRC possibly associated to dj ;
Σ ← sum of probabilites of identifiers in not rs;
total ← total number of times a DSRC possibly associated to dj was seen
with any WiFi;
foreach WiFi wi in d2w mb [dj ] do
mult ← number of times a DSRC possibly associated to dj was seen
with wi ;
mtx[i,j] +=

Σ∗∆00
total

* mult;

end
end
Algorithm 9: w2d level3 boosting Finds and applies W2D Level 3 possible
associations into the W2D matrix
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4.4.4

WiFi Null Boosting

The final step of the W2D matrix construction is WiFi Null Boosting, where I apply
the boosting method to the WiFi Null row for any DSRC pseudonym seen without an
overlapping WiFi identifier. I do this by keeping a count for each DSRC pseudonym
of the number of times it was seen without any overlapping WiFi identifier. Iterating
through each listener’s recorded observation intervals, if a listener l did not see any
WiFi signals, then for each DSRC pseudonym that l recorded an observation interval
for, I increment its count by 1. Once I have calculated each pseudonym’s count, for
each pseudonym dj , I boost WiFi Null the number of times dj was seen without an
overlapping WiFi signal. I use a redistribution factor value of 0.1 for my experiments.
The reasoning for this approach is that DSRC pseudonyms originating from vehicles without WiFi capability would be more likely to be seen without an overlapping
WiFi signal than pseudonyms originating from vehicles with WiFi capability. However, due to the nature of the signal protocols’ heart rates, many more pseudonyms
are seen without an overlapping WiFi signal than those that actually originate from
a vehicle without WiFi capaiblity. Due to the high uncertainty of this method, I
opted to use a low redistribution factor as I still wanted to factor in pseudonyms
seen without a WiFi signal, but not detract from the findings of other methods in
the W2D matrix construction. The pseudocode for WiFi Null Boosting is found in
Algorithm 10.
The WiFi signal in my experiements is acting as a base station, where it broadcast
to announce its presence. In a real-world scenario, this can be affected by cellular
devices that act as WiFi hotspots. For the purposes of this project, I assume that
vehicles are the only source of WiFi signals within the areas.
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Input: mtx: current (N+1)xM matrix for WiFi-to-DSRC associations,
l2wobis: Dictionary mapping listener to its set of WiFi observation
intervals, l2dobis: Dictionary mapping listener to its set of DSRC
observation intervals, ∆null : Redistribution factor for WiFi null value between (0,1)
Result: Boosts DSRC pseudonyms that likely originate from vehicle without
WiFi capabilty with WiFi Null row in matrix for the number of
times they were seen without an overlapping WiFi signal
d count ← emptyhashmap
foreach listener L and its set of DSRC observation intervals dobis do
if L has no WiFi observations then
Increment the count of each DSRC dobis by 1 in d count
else
foreach DSRC observation interval dobi ∈ dobis do
if dobi does not overlap in time with any of L’s WiFi observation
intervals then
Increment the count of dobi’s DSRC pseudonym by 1 in d count
end
end
foreach DSRC pseudonym d j ∈ and its count ∈ d count do
Boost the WiFi Null probability count times in mtx using ∆null as the
redistribution factor, taking the boost from all rows except WiFi Null
end
Algorithm 10: WiFi Null Boost Boosts WiFi Null probability for DSRC
pseudonyms possibly originating from vehicle without WiFi capability
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4.5

Confidence Threshold

Once the W2D matrix construction is completed, I use a confidence threshold to
conclude which of the associations I actually consider to be associations. For my
experiments, I use a confidence threshold of 0.5. That is, if an elementij of the
W2D matrix is greater than 0.5, then I conclude that WiFi identifier wi and DSRC
pseudonym dj are associated. I use a threshold of 0.5 because any probability over
50% indicates a majority. Remember that each column sum to 1 or 100%. Therefore,
if I used a threshold under 50%, then there is a likelihood that a pseudonym is found
to be associated to multiple identifiers. Therefore, 0.5 is the minimum threshold
required to ensure an pseudonym is associated to only a single identifier.

4.6

Path Reconstruction

I then use the W2D associations to reconstruct a vehicle’s path. For each WiFi
identifier wi , I find all DSRC pseudonyms dj in set D such that elementij in the W2D
matrix meets the confidence threshold. All observation intervals with a pseudonym
belonging in D or the identifier wi are ordered in ascending time order, and a Euclidian
distance is drawn between subsequent intervals’ listeners. Because the main concern
of this thesis was pseudonym association and not path reconstruction, I opted for
this simplistic approach. A more accurate path can be reconstructed by using a
Manhattan distance line or the actual target map’s roads to connect subsequent
listeners.
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Chapter 5
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

I use the SUMO traffic simulator [2] to simulate realistic vehicle traffic in three cities:
Eichstätt, Mions, and Melun. I choose these towns, a German town and two French
communes, because they have centralized medium-size downtown districts that would
realistically see a lot of vehicle traffic. The Eichstätt map measures approximately 12
km2 in area and its traffic simulation had 200 vehicles with 1627 pseudonyms across all
vehicles, and average trip length of 4.5 km. The Mions map measures approximately
5.7 km2 in area and its simulation had 300 vehicles with 1515 pseudonyms, and an
average trip length of 1.8 km. The Melun map measures approximately 8.7 km2 in
area and its simulation had 300 vehicles with 2284 pseudonyms, and an average trip
length of 2.4 km.
Because I do not have complete listener coverage, I am unable to receive a packet
from every identifier and pseudonym. Therefore, I evaluate my attack solely based on
the packets received by the listeners. In my simulations, I use simulated DSRC-like
and WiFi-like radios as the long-distance pseudonym changing protocol and shortdistance non-changing protocol, respectively. The different parameters for my radio
protocols are summarized in Table 5.1. For my simulations, the DSRC protocol has
a range of 100 meters, a heart rate of 0.1 seconds, and a change rate of 30 seconds;
the WiFi protocol has a range of 25 meters and a heart rate of 30 seconds. Because
WiFi uses a non-changing identifier, I set its change rate to ∞.
Table 5.1: Radio Protocol Parameters for Simulations
Radio

range (m)

heart rate (s)

change rate (s)

DSRC

1000

0.1

30

WiFi

25

30

∞
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To model packet reception at the listeners, I step through each simulated vehicle’s
path, stopping at the given heart rates of the signals to broadcast the respective
signals. I use varying WiFi penetration rates, ranging from 50% to 100% while
maintaining a 100% penetration rate for DSRC capability. The WiFi penetration
rate defines what percentage of vehicles within the network have WiFi capability. I
use varying WiFi penetration rates to test the robustness of the attack when not all
vehicles have WiFi capability. Non WiFi enabled vehicles will continue to emit DSRC
packets. An attack will not know that pseudonyms associated with these packets
originate from a vehicle without WiFi capability, and thus varying WiFi penetration
rates test the ability of the attack to filter out noise pseudonyms. I assume a 100%
DSRC penetration rate due to its many appplications in road safety. Therefore, it
is likely to be federally mandated and required in future modern vehicles. Signal
broadcast data is stored in a MongoDB database; I record the broadcasting vehicle’s
ID, the coordinate of the broadcast, the time of broadcast, the signal protocol, and
the pseudonym or identifier associated to the signal at the time. I use a handpicked
listener placement setup for each map, with a set of 20 listeners and a focus on heavy
traffic areas, such as busy intersections. During listener placement, I also ensure that
listeners do not overlap in coverage, as many of my attack methods assume nonoverlapping listener coverage. Example listener placement configurations for each
map are illustrated in Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, where a red circle represents the
coverage of a single listener. I implement my attack in Python with the usage of the
NumPy package. Because my attack model is a generalizable model, the following
parameters can be configured to simulate a variety of scenarios:
• Map and listener placements
• Long-distance pseudonym changing protocol
– range
– heart rate
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– change rate
• Short-distance non-changing protocol
– range
– heart rate
– penetration rate
• Maximum Weight percentage for X2E Attack
• D2D Matrix Construction steps
• ∆, ∆0 , ∆00 (Redistribution factors for Boosting in W2D matrix construction)
• Confidence Threshold

Figure 5.1: Example SUMO map with listener placements, Map: Eichstätt
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Figure 5.2: Example SUMO map with listener placements, Map: Mions

Figure 5.3: Example SUMO map with listener placements, Map: Melun

To measure the effectiveness of my results, I measure the number of associations
made, the number of correct associations made, the average W2D (WiFi-to-DSRC)
association precision, the average W2D association recall, the total D2D (DSRC73

to-DSRC) association precision, and the total D2D association recall. Precision is
a measure of how accurate the average guessed association is. That is, among the
guessed associations, how many of them were correct. Precision is equal to the number
of true-positives divided by the sum of true-positives and false-positives, that is the
number of correct associations made divided by the total number of associations
made. Recall is a measure of how many of the total actual associations we got
correct. Recall is the number of true-positives divided by the sum of true-positives
and true-negatives, that is the number of correct associations made divided by the
total number of actual associations.
T rueP ositive
T rueP ositive + F alseP ositive
Correct Associations Made
=
Total Guessed Associations

P recision =

T rueP ositive
T rueP ositive + T rueN egatives
Correct Associations Made
=
Total Actual Associations

(5.1)

Recall =

(5.2)

D2D association precision and recall allow me to gauge how effective my D2D matrix construction strategies are. To calculate these values, I construct a separate D2D
association matrix containing all the actual D2D associations involving pseudonyms
seen by the listeners. Then I compare my D2D association matrix against the newly
constructed actual association matrix; I record the number of true positives, true
negatives, and false positives to use in the precision and recall calculations. Making
correct D2D associations is fundamentally the goal of previous attacks that are limited to a single signal protocol [6][3][5][24]. However, D2D precision and recall only
measure a portion of the effectiveness of the D2D associations. Because I use two
signals, the other being the unique identifier of vehicles, the average W2D association
precision and recall are also a measure of how useful the D2D association data is when
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constructing the W2D matrix. Note that I do not use D2D possible associations or
disassociations for any of the precision and recall calculations.
The number of total associations made and number of correct associations is a
simple means of measuring the effectiveness of the attack model. It allows me to
quickly see the effects of tuning a parameter or changing part of my matrices construction strategies. However, because I am measuring W2D associations and the
number of learnable W2D associations changes based on the WiFi penetration rate,
these numbers on their own do not tell me much information without a number to
compare to. Therefore, I need to also take into account the number of actual associations. The number of learnable W2D associations is based on the WiFi penetration
rate because I leverage WiFi identifiers to uniquely identify vehicles; vehicles without
WiFi capability are unknown to the attack model. Therefore, the model has no means
of associating DSRC pseudonyms to a vehicle without WiFi capaiblity.
The average W2D association precision and recall are the core measurement of
how effective the attack model is. For each uniquely identifiable vehicle (i.e. each
WiFi identifier), I calculate the precision and recall for that vehicle, then average the
calculations across all vehicles to get an average precision and recall.
The following sections detail the results of my experiments running the attack
against different scenarios and configurations.
• General Attack Results
– Measures the overall effectiveness of the attack to create W2D associations
• Attack Across Different Maps
– Measures the effectiveness of the attack across different maps
• D2D Techniques
– Measures the effectiveness of different D2D association techniques and how
those affect W2D associations
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• ∆ Tuning
– Illustrates how different ∆ values affect W2D associations made
• Weight Calculations
– Compares the effectiveness of the attack using my weight calculation in
the X2E attack and using the previous weight calculation

5.1

General Attack Results

To show the general effectiveness of the attack model, I run the attack on a single
map with WiFi penetration rates ranging from 50-100% in 10% increments to get
a measure of the general effectiveness of the attack. For this experiment, I use the
traffic simulation on the Eichstätt map, all steps of the D2D matrix construction,
∆ = 0.6, ∆0 = 0.9, and ∆00 = 0.45.
I see a D2D association precision of about 96% and a D2D association recall of
18%. Comparitively, in a previous paper [6], using their version of the X2E Attack,
the authors are only able to correctly match about 6% of the exit-enter trips when
the change rate of vehicles is 30 seconds. Their simulation used 250 vehicles with
an average trip duration of 479 seconds and 5 observation nodes. My simulation
used 20 observation nodes and 200 vehicles with trips ranging between a minute to
9 minutes and an average distance of 4.5 km. While their attack does not evaluate
effectiveness in the same measures my attack model does, it does give me a starting
point to compare to. Note that their results include any exit-enter event pairs that
have the same pseudonyms, something that is not considered in my measurements.
In another paper [24], using the contents of the DSRC packets to build anonymous
location profiles and associate vehicles to their respective profiles, the authors were
able to track vehicles for the entire 1000 second trip duration if vehicles kept their
pseudonyms for longer than 3 seconds. However, their techniques required complete
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listener coverage and the ability to gather vehicle location and trajectory data from
the DSRC packets. When they introduce random spatial noise within the data packets, even a single meter of noise added caused tracking to drop to less than 20% of the
trip when there were 250 vehicles present. When even more noise was added (2 to 5
meters), tracking dropped to less than 10% of the trip when using 250 vehicles. They
also consider penetration rate into their system, but unlike my simulation model,
they consider it as advantageous, as they have less vehicles to track. This second
paper exemplifies the tracking capabilities given perfect data gathering capabilities.
However, my attack model assumes only partial gathering of information. I use 20
handpicked listeners focusing on high traffic areas, such as busy intersections, but
the attack model can be configured to accept any number of listeners and placement
configuration.
I see a general decline in both the number of associations made and the number
of correct associations made as the WiFi penetration rate decrease, as shown in
Figure 5.4. This is to be expected, as the number of actual associations is directly
correlated to the WiFi penetration rate.
The average W2D association precision is fairly consistent across all WiFi penetration rates, with an average of about 78.7% (low of 74.8% at the 50% WiFi penetration
rate, and a high of 81% at the 70% WiFi penetration rate). The average W2D recall
is also fairly consistent across all WiFi penetration rates, with an average of about
21.7% (low of 20.2% at the 100% WiFi penetration rate, and a high of 23.8% at the
70% WiFi penetration rate). These results are shown in Figure 5.5 and show that my
attack is consistent across different WiFi penetration rates. As the WiFi penetration
rate decreases, the ratio of number of vehicles with WiFi capability and those without begins to skew toward those without. That is, the number of vehicles with WiFi
capability decreases, and the number of vehicles without WiFi capabiity increases.
Less vehicles with WiFi capaiblity means less number of actual associations to cor77

Figure 5.4: Associations vs. Different Penetration Rates
rectly guess, while more vehicles withouth WiFi capability means more DSRC noise
in the system, as these vehicles continue to emit DSRC packets. DSRC pseudonyms
originating from vehicles withouth WiFi capaiblity do not associate to any identifier
known to my system, but are still picked up by listeners and introduce complexity
to the system. However, my attack model has shown to perform at the same level
of average precision and recall regardless of WiFi penetration rate. This means that,
regardless of the WiFi penetration rate, my attack model is able to, for the average
vehicle, correctly guess an association 78.7% of the time and find about 21.7% of its
total DSRC pseudonyms.

5.2

Attack Across Different Maps

In this section, I test my attack model against different maps to ensure that my
attack is effective across not only my initial test map, but also other maps. The
traffic simulation scenarios differ among all maps to ensure variance in my tests.
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Figure 5.5: Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Different Penetration
Rates
These differences include number of vehicles and number of DSRC pseudonyms. For
these tests, I use alternating WiFi penetration rates from 50-100% in 10% increments,
all steps of the D2D matrix construction, and ∆ values of ∆ = 0.6, ∆0 = 0.9, and
∆00 = 0.45.
For Melun, I get a D2D precision of 98% and a D2D recall of 24%. For Mions, I
get a D2D precision of 98% and a recall of 38.7%. For the orginal map of Eichstätt,
I get a D2D precision of 96.7% and a D2D recall of 18.4%. While D2D precision is
consistently high across the different maps, D2D recall is not. This may be explained
by a number of things. One possiblity is the inclusion of the X2E attack, which is
affected by many factors outside of my control. My attack may not have seen every
exit and enter event to construct a perfect bipartite graph. If an exit or enter event
has a corresponding event that was not seen by one of my listeners, then the event still
needs to be paired with another event to construct a minimum sum graph, causing
incorrect edges to be chosen. The different traffic simulations also use different number
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of vehicles and pseudonyms. Melun had 300 vehicles with 2284 total pseudonyms,
averaging around 7 pseudonyms a vehicle. Mions had 300 vehicles with 1515 total
pseudonyms, averaging 5 pseudonyms a vehicle. Eichstätt had 200 vehicles with 1627
total pseudonyms, averaging 8 pseudonyms a vehicle. Note that the listeners are
unable to pick up a signal packet from every pseudonym, therefore my attack model
is only aware of the information received recorded by the listener. In the future, I plan
to research a correlation between number of vehicles, total number of pseudonyms,
number of pseudonyms per vehicle, or a combination of these factors with my attack
results, but this is an area for future research.
Map size also affects the attack model’s effectiveness. Because I maintain a set
of 20 listeners, the percentage of map coverage is significantly different between the
maps. We can see that the Eichstätt simulation, which had the largest map size of
12 km2 , saw the smallest D2D recall of 18.4%, while the Mions simulation, which
had the smallest map size of 5.7 km2 , saw the largest D2D recall of 38.7%. A greater
listener coverage results in a larger percentage of the radio packets intercepted, that
is, more data to form conclusions from. Future research is to explore the correlation
between map size and listener density to the effectiveness of the attack model.
Figure 5.6 shows the average W2D precision and recall across all three maps.
Across all maps, I get an average precision of about 80% and an average recall of
about 23%. For Melun, I get an average W2D precision of 81% and an average W2D
recall of 23%. For Mions, I get an average W2D precision of 82% and an average W2D
recall of 26%. These are very similar to the results of my initial test on Eichstätt,
which saw an average W2D precision of 78% and an average W2D recall of 21%.
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Figure 5.6: Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Different Maps
5.3

Delta Tuning

In this section, I detail the results of my ∆ tuning through experimentation and
show the effects of increasing or lowering ∆. While the attack model is not confined
to having the redistribution factors for Level 2 and Level 3 boosting (∆0 and ∆00 ,
respectively) be equationally based on ∆, I maintain the use of:
∆0 = 1.5 ∗ ∆

(5.3)

∆00 = 0.75 ∗ ∆

(5.4)

to remain consistent. These relative values were chosen as explained in Section 4.4.3.
These tests were run on the Eichstätt simulation, using all parts of the D2D matrix
construction, and using alternating WiFi penetration rates from 50-100% in 10%
increments. The results of my experiements for monitoring the effects of changing
the initial ∆ value on W2D associations are shown in Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8.
I see that by increasing ∆ from 0.6 up to 0.8, I greatly increase the number of
W2D associations made, with only a small percentage of them being correct. This
is illustrated in both the raw numbers in Figure 5.7 as well as the relatively similar
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Figure 5.7: Associations vs Delta Value

Figure 5.8: Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Delta Value
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average W2D recall values between the two for each WiFi penetration rate, but
lower average W2D precision values when ∆ = 0.8 as shown in Figure 5.8. The
large ∆ caused many probabilities that previously were not great enough to meet the
confidence threshold to be pushed over the edge. While there is a small increase in
average recall (i.e. number of correct associations), the hit to precision caused by
the increased number of false positives outweighed the benefits getting a very slightly
higher recall from a few more correct associations.
Decreasing ∆ from 0.6 to 0.4 results in a large boost to the average W2D precision (increasing between 6-11%), but also a large hit to the average W2D recall
(decreasing between 4-5%). This change can be explained as a smaller magnitude in
boosting during the handling of W2D possible associations. While the same association probabiliies are being boosted, many of them are no longer being boosted enough
to meet the confidence threshold. Therefore only those with multiple supporting data
points will have a probability to meet the confidence threshold, while those that only
have one or a couple supporting data points, even if they are correct, will not meet
the necessary confidence threshold, and will not be concluded as associations by the
attack model.
While the absolute increase in precision is greater than the absolute decrease in
recall in terms of percentage, relative to their existing values, the recall decrease is
greater than the precision increase. That is, precision was already fairly high, around
80%, while recall was fairly low, around 21%, meaning an equal absolute change to
both will affect recall relatively more. For example, using the largest precision increase where the WiFi penetration rate is equal to 80%, the average precision increase
from 78.7% to 89.9% when decreasing ∆, meaning that the average precision saw an
0.899
). Using the same
absolute increase of 11.2% and a relative increase of 14% ( 0.787

WiFi penetration rate, the average recall decreases from 21.8% to 17.6%. meaning
that the average rcall saw an absolute decrease of 4.2%, but a relative decrease of
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Figure 5.9: D2D Precision & Recall vs. D2D Strategy
19% (1 −

0.176
).
0.218

Therefore, the relative change in average recall is greater than that

of the average precision, even though the absolute change in the average precision is
greater than that of the average recall.

5.4

D2D Techniques

In this section, I run my attack model using different configurations for the D2D
matrix construction. I run the tests using all parts of the D2D matrix construction,
just the Same Listener Attack, just the X2E Attack, and once without any D2D
information. Note that the transitive property is applied to all configurations at
the end. These tests were run on the Eichstätt simulation, using alternating WiFi
penetration rates from 50-100% in 10% increments, and ∆ values of ∆ = 0.6, ∆0 = 0.9,
and ∆00 = 0.45.
I begin by looking at the D2D precision and recall using different D2D strategies;
Figure 5.9 shows my results. Note that even without any D2D matrix construction
strategies, I still include the self-associations, where pseudonyms are associated to
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themselves. This alone gives me a recall of 12.6%, which serves as a baseline for
comparison. Using just the X2E Attack, I get a precision of 98% and a recall of
14.4%, meaning an actual gain of 1.8%. Using just the Same Listener Attack, I
also get a precision of 98%, but a recall of 17.1%, meaning an actual gain of 4.5%.
Therefore, while the X2E attack has the same precision as the Same Listener Attacker,
it has a lower recall. For the X2E attack, I am able to have such a high precision
through the use of the maximum weight to filter out the less likely to be correct edges
when solving the biparitite graph. Without the filter, I would have a large number of
false positives, which would, in conjunction with the cascading effects of the transitive
property application at the end, lead to a much worse precision, with very little, if
any, increase yield in recall. I do not use the possible associations in the D2D matrix
to calculate the D2D precision or recall.
Using both the Same Listener Attack and X2E attack gave me a D2D precision
of 96.7% and a recall of 18.4%. The slight dip in precision is most likely due to the
combined false positives from both the Same Listener Attack and X2E Attack, as
both did not have 100% precision. I also looked into applying the transitive property
after the Same Listener Attack, not just at the end. However, this strategy gave
me slightly poorer performance, most likely due to any false positives in the Same
Listener Attack that may cause further cascading false positives. Therefore I opted to
simply apply the transitive property at the end. I also chose to run the X2E Attack
after the Same Listener Attack because the Same Listener Attack is a standalone
attack, while my X2E Attack had been modified from the original attack [6] to take
advantage of any previously found D2D associations.
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Figure 5.10: Associations vs. D2D Strategy

Figure 5.11: Average W2D Precision vs. D2D Strategy
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Figure 5.12: Average W2D Recall vs. D2D Strategy

The results of my experiments monitoring how different D2D matrix construction
strategies affect W2D assciations are shown in Figure 5.11, Figure 5.12, and Figure 5.10. The average W2D precision is consistent across all configurations, ranging
between around 79-80%. For the average W2D recall, using both D2D attacks gave
me the best results, followed by the Same Listener Attack, the X2E Attack, and then
no D2D association information. This is similar to the D2D association recall performance comparisons. Because precision stays the same, but recall drops as I use
less effective D2D matrix construction strategies this means that I am making more
guesses as I employ more effective D2D strategies. The new guesses are coming from
my boosting. For example, given that the probability of w1 and d1 being associated
were to be boosted to the point of meeting the confidence threshold, and d1 and d2
were previously found to be associated, then if there was no D2D association information or if I did not effectively use the information, then only d1 would be found
to be associated to w1 , while d2 is actually associated to w1 as well, but their association probability was not boosted accordingly. This is why I employ the use of the
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Level 2 boosting, to use the D2D association information to expand the number of
associations I can make, even if a small percentage of these are incorrect.

5.5

Weight Calculation

Figure 5.13: Associations vs. Weight Calculation
In this section, I detail the comparison between the previous methodology found
in [6] and my methdology for weight calculations when constructing the bipartite
graph in the X2E Attack. The previous methdology places less of an emphasis on the
average travel time of vehicles than my methdology does, opting to make its significance relative to the actual travel time of a vehicle being observed. My methdology
gives greater credence to the average travel time, while still penalizing actual travel
times that greatly differ from the average. For these tests, I use alternating WiFi
penetration rates from 50-100% in 10% increments, all steps of the D2D matrix construction only changing the weight calculations accordingly, and ∆ values of ∆ = 0.6,
∆0 = 0.9, and ∆00 = 0.45.
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Figure 5.14: Average W2D Precision & Recall vs. Weight Calculation
For D2D association results, both results saw a precision of about 98%, but the
previous method saw a recall of 13.8%, while the new method saw a recall of 14.4%.
Similarly for W2D association results, as shown in Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14, I see
similar average precisions, with a small increase in the average recall. So while only
a fairly small improvement in both D2D and W2D recall, my new weight calculation
method consistently outperforms the previous method.
I correlate the more informative weight values to the information that I consider
for the weight calculations. The previous method made the difference between actual
travel time and average travel time a large factor in the weight calculations. Contrarily, my method places a heavier emphasis on the average travel time of vehicles,
while still factoring in the difference between actual travel time and average travel
time, albeit not to the degree of the previous method. Both methods place a large
emphasis on the number of vehicles that previously traveled between two points.
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5.6

Path Reconstruction

Finally, I reconstruct vehicles’ paths using the technique explained in Chapter 4, then
visualize and compare them to the vehicles’ actual paths. Figure 5.15 shows three
example comparisons between the reconstructed paths and actual paths, one for each
map. The actual path is plotted with alternating colors (red and black) where a color
change indicates a pseudonym change. I include these path reconstruction examples
to illustrate the overall goal and usage of the associations made using the attack
model.
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(a) Reconstructed Path Eichstätt

(b) Actual Path Eichstätt

(c) Reconstructed Path Mions

(d) Actual Path Mions

(e) Reconstructed Path Melun

(f) Actual Path Melun

Figure 5.15: Reconstructed Path vs. Actual Path
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Chapter 6
FUTURE WORKS

This chapter discusses possible future works that could expand upon the effectiveness
of this attack on vehicular privacy in VANETs.

6.1

Expanding to k Signals

Our current attack model uses two generic signal protocols: long-distance pseudonym
changing and short-distance non-changing. A future work is to expand the attack to
take any arbitrary k number of signal protocols. This will allow for an even more
generalizable attack model, one that works on any scenario involving radio signals.

6.2

∆ Tuning

Because our current ∆ values were chosen through experimentation and trial and
error, they are not necessarily the optimal values. Future work would include tuning
the values using machine learning techniques to see if there are values that result in
optimal effectiveness across many different maps. If there are no universal best values,
then finding how factors such as map size or number of vehicles and pseudonyms affect
the effectiveness of the ∆ values.

6.3

Confidence Threshold and Second Most Likely Candidate

Another area of future research related to ∆ tuning is the confidence threshold. Because adjusting ∆ affects the amount of boost elements in the matrix get during
matrix construction, adjusting the confidence threshold will also affect how much
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boost is required to actually be considered an association. Furthermore, if for a given
pseudonym the identifier it is concluded to be associated with is incorrect, then is the
second most likely candidate in terms of probability the correct association? Future
research can look into statistical analysis of incorporating secondary association into
path reconstruction in the case of incorrect primary associations.

6.4

Distinguishing Vehicles Without WiFi Capability

Because our attack leverages WiFi identifiers to uniquely distinguish the number
of vehicles in the area of observation, whenever the WiFi penetration rate is below
100%, we do not correctly identify the number of vehicles and have no means of
discovering the number of vehicles without WiFi capability. We previously tried to
solve this problem to an extent through our WiFi Null Boosting method, but due
to the nature of the signal protocols heart rates, too many DSRC pseudonyms were
boosted in their association to WiFi Null, thus yielding too many false positives to
make the method useful. Furthermore, this method only tries to address the issue of
which pseudonyms originated from vehicles without WiFi capability, not actually how
many vehicles without WiFi capability there are. Future work would be to continue
research into methods to distinguish the number of vehicles there are in the area of
observation when not all vehicles share a common unique identifier.

6.5

Optimal Listener Placement

Our current attack model simply uses hand placed listener placement configuration
for its listener placements. However, the attack could greatly benefit from a more
optimal listener placement configuration. A previous Cal Poly Senior Project uses
a genetic algorithm to find the optimal placement for listeners. A genetic algorithm
is an algorithm that begins with a population of candidate solutions, in our case
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the listener placement locations, and iteratively adjusts or mutates the population to
optimize the solution to a problem. The effectiveness of the population is determined
by a fitness function. By using the students algorithm, we can use our attack as
the fitness function, with the average precision and average recall of WiFi-to-DSRC
associations, and precision and recall of DSRC-to-DSRC associations be quantitative
measurements of fitness.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION

Maintaining vehicle security when expanding the technological applications of VANETs
is a key component in preserving user privacy and safety. An important step in defending against vehicular privacy attacks is to know what attackers are capable of
accomplishing. This thesis presents the attack model that I have developed and its
effectiveness at associating pseudonyms.
Using previous research into pseudonym change strategies and VANET attacks, I
have developed a passive attack mode that uses a general long-distance pseudonym
changing protocol and a general short-distance non-changing protocol to uniquely
identify vehicles and associate pseudonyms to their respective vehicles. This information can then ultimately be used to reconstruct a vehicle’s path, allowing an attacker
to track a numer of vehicles for an extended period of time. My attack model incorporates previously researched attacks into my new techniques, as well as implementing
a more effective weight calculation in the commonly used Exit-to-Enter Attack.
Testing using different WiFi market penetration rates, that is the percentage of
vehicles in the system that have WiFi capability, and different maps, my attack model
consistently maintains a WiFi-to-DSRC association average precision of around 80%
and an average recall of 23%, results that can be possibly even further improved by
tuning different parameters in the attack model through the use of machine learning
techniques. These results are comparatively better than previous association techniques.
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Overall, this thesis helps outline the capabilities of a malicious attacker. The
attack model can be used in future research to develop effective defense strategies to
combat attackers and preserve user privacy and safety in VANETs.
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